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This thesis examines the strategic defensive doctrines of
both the Soviet Union and the United States, and further
explores the concrete manifestations of the disparities in
those doctrines. The evolution of the defensive components
of national strategies is traced from the end of World War II
to the present, and specific defensive systems are described.
The focus is on the impact of strategy on deployment of
antiballistic missile systems, antiaircraft defenses, and
civil defense programs. A comparison of current strategic
defensive deployments highlights the differences in the
doctrines adopted by the two nations. While the Soviet Union
has deployed substantial defensive systems, the United States
has chosen to forego all but minimal antiaircraft defenses.
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The combined strategic arsenals of the Soviet Union and
the United States total over 20,000 nuclear warheads,
deliverable by means of intercontinental ballistic missiles,
sea-launched ballistic missiles, and bombers. 1 These
arsenals, however, as an example of offensive power, give an
incomplete picture of the superpower correlation. To
complement its offensive capabilities, the Soviet Union has
in place ballistic missile defenses, antiaircraft defenses,
and an extensive civil defense program". The United States,
on the other hand, has, except for a half-dozen squadrons of
fighter-interceptors dedicated to air defense, almost
completely foregone strategic defense as a component of its
deterrence and warfighting strategies.
What accounts for this difference? While both nations
might be characterized as "offense-heavy, " why has the Soviet
Union alone dedicated such a large percentage of its defense
expenditures to strategic defenses? Why does the United
States prefer to rely on its offensive forces to the near-
exclusion of defense? What effect do these differences have
1 The Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 230.
on each nation's ability and willingness to fight and to deter
the other? These are the questions this thesis will attempt
to answer.
B. PURPOSE
In this thesis, the respective attitudes of the Soviet
Union and the United States toward strategic defense as a
component of strategic doctrine will be explored through
examination of military doctrine and defensive capabilities.
In particular, antiballistic missile defenses, antiaircraft
defenses, and civil defense will be assessed - with the
realization that these systems do not, of course, exist in a
vacuum. They are, rather, components of a much larger
paradigm that includes elements ranging from each nation's
national interests and goals to the characteristics of their
particular offensive weapons, and how those weapons interact
with defensive systems. The paradigm includes as well other
classes warfare short of "global thermonuclear war, " other
types of defensive efforts, such as antisubmarine warfare and
anticruise missile defense, and the early warning and
surveillance systems associated with both offensive and
defensive efforts.
C. SCOPE
This thesis is restricted to analysis of the three types
of strategic defenses specified above, primarily because they
have in common one particular characteristic: these three,
if deterrence should fail, are meant to counter nuclear
weapons which have been launched toward an adversary's
homeland, and then abate or eliminate the effects of those
weapons. These three types of defense also provide the best
open-source opportunity for comparison of U.S. and Soviet
doctrines and deployments. In particular, what these types
of defenses defend against, how they defend, and what they
defend can be fairly well discerned. Measures of
effectiveness are another matter, if one is to believe the
intense current debate over the Strategic Defense Initiative
in the U.S. But measuring effectiveness is peripheral to the
purpose of this thesis, whose focus is instead doctrinal
differences and the physical manifestations of those
differences. The merit of this thesis is not the
technological evaluation of strategic defenses, but the impact
that national strategies of the Soviet Union and United States
have had on their acquisition and maintenance.
In an attempt to answer the questions posed earlier, this
thesis will first offer a definition of the concept of defense
and describe the uses of defense as a deterrent, a function
(
"
what it defends") and a method (
"
how it defends"). Next,
the evolution of both U.S. and Soviet strategic defensive
doctrine, and the resulting defensive programs and
capabilities will be examined. A simple net assessment will
follow, in order to compare the defensive efforts undertaken
by the two superpowers. Finally, the conclusions and findings
of this thesis will be presented in a summary chapter.
II. DEFINING STRATEGIC DEFENSE
A. OFFENSE AND DEFENSE COMPARED
"What is the concept of defense?" von Clausewitz asked.
"The parrying of a blow. What is its characteristic feature?
Awaiting the blow. It is this feature that turns any action
into a defensive one; it is the only test by which defense can
be distinguished from attack in war. . . .defense in war can only
be relative. . . .
"
2
As Clausewitz suggests, defense and offense are sometimes
difficult to distinguish from each other. Sometimes described
as opposites, or at a minimum placed at opposing ends of a
spectrum, offense and defense in reality overlap,
interconnect, and exist at various levels, from individual
weapons and military capabilities to military strategies and
political goals. "The concept of the offensive/defensive
balance of military technology, " says one writer, "has been
defined in the literature in terms of the defeat of enemy
armed forces, the ease of territorial conquest, protection of
population, tactical mobility, the characteristics of
2 Carl von Clausewitz, On War , edited and translated by
Michael Howard and Peter Paret (Princeton, NJ: Princeton
University Press, 1976), p. 357.
armaments, the relative resources expended on the offense and
the defense, and the incentive to strike first." 3
Offense and defense may, in fact, coexist and be effected
by the same instruments. At different points in history, one
use has usually predominated over the other in what can be
described as a permanent dialectic, wherein "different mixes
of offensive and defensive weapons are selected for
synergistic effect as technologies evolve, doctrines alter,
and military missions shift." 4 A decision to concentrate on
offense or defense may be the result of economic or political
circumstances, or extant technology levels. 5 The important
point is that the offense/defense characteristic resides far
more in the purpose for which a weapon is intended, or the way
it is finally used, than in the weapon itself.
As long as this last point is kept in mind, it may be
helpful to discuss the impact of technology on offense/defense
predominance today. One Western expert, in describing the
"pendulum of advantage, " notes that strategic offensive
technologies are currently relatively mature, while defensive
technologies are immature. This means, he says, "that for the
Jack S. Levy, "The Offensive/Defensive Balance of




(1984) 28, p. 234.
4 Colin S. Gray, "The Transition from Offense to
Defense," The Washington Quarterly
,
Summer, 1986, p. 65.
5 Michael J. Deane and liana Kass, "Why Strategic Defense
But Not Defensive Strategy?" Signal
,
November, 1987, p. 108.
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next several decades at least the advantage in growth in
performance potential ought to plainly lie with the defence." 6
Indeed, some experts foresee the possibility that
technological developments will undermine current strategies,
particularly when these strategies rely on the threat of
punitive retaliatory action. For example, research in non-
acoustic detection of submerged submarines, which might carry
warheads reserved for second strikes, continues, and missiles
and warheads, which might destroy strategic nuclear reserves,
are becoming increasingly accurate. Any strategy based on the
ability to inflict destruction on an enemy through the use of
second-strike offensive weapons could be thwarted if the
survivability of those weapons is not ensured. And if
deterrence based on a retaliatory strategy fails, "the result
is catastrophic. In Pentagon language, the doctrine does not
degrade gracefully." 7
While technology may have an impact on the strategic
choices a nation makes at any given time, it is not until one
attempts description of military strategies and political
goals that the distinction between offense and defense is made
clearer. Simply stated, an offensive strategy involves using
military forces to attack, destroy, seize and hold in order
6 Colin S. Gray, "Strategic Defenses," Survival , March/
April, 1985, p. 54.
7 Robert Jastrow, "The Technical Feasibility of Ballistic
Missile Defense, " Journal of International Affairs
,
Summer,
1985, Vol. 39, No. 1, p. 45.
to change one or more elements of the political, territorial,
or military status quo. A defensive strategy condones none
of these things, but aspires mainly to prevent the enemy from
doing them. 8 In order to prevent an enemy from carrying out
his objectives, a nation cannot sit back and hope that nothing
happens. Defensive strategies require expenditures of time,
resources and effort if they are to be effective.
B. THE PURPOSE OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE
"The aggressor is always peace-loving (as Bonaparte always
claimed to be); he would prefer to take over our country
unopposed. To prevent his doing so," Clausewitz recommended,
"one must be willing make war and be prepared for it." 9
Strategic defense is therefore a preventive measure aimed at
"the preservation by military means of those things a society
values most. " 10
Strategic defense operates in two primary ways. First,
it can serve as a means to deter an enemy from attacking. As
some offensive strategies can deter through threat of
punishment, defensive strategies are a form of deterrence
8 Samuel P. Huntington, "U.S. Defense Strategy: The
Strategic Innovations of the Reagan Years," in Joseph Kruzel,
ed., American Defense Annual 1987-1988 (Lexington, MA: D.C.
Heath/Lexington Books, 1987), p. 37.
9 Clausewitz, p. 370.
10 Lawrence Freedman, Strategic Defense in the Nuclear
Age (London: International Institute for Strategic Studies,
1987), p. 9.
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based on denial. "A defense which frightens the attacker
away... is a major military asset," because it has complicated
the attacker's job, denied him a free ride, 11 and dissuaded
him from attacking. Contrary to popular assumption,
therefore, deterrence and defense are not mutually exclusive.
Rather, defense is a method of deterrence, deterrence through
denial; the problem is that this method of deterrence is
frequently ignored.
Some strategists view strategies based on the threat of
mutual assured destruction as the "inevitable consequence of
the superpowers having the nuclear arsenals they have." It
is therefore not subject to political volition; 12 it will exist
as long as the arsenals required to effect it are preserved.
Firmly embedded in human consciousness, " [d]eterrence in the
nuclear age has come to be understood in terms of mutual
threats of nuclear devastation varying only in kinds of
targets, i.e., countermilitary, counter-industrial, counter-
city, or all of these." 13 Perhaps because this type of
11 Charles M. Herzfeld, "Missile Defense: Can It Work?"
in Johan J. Hoist and William Schneider, Jr., eds, Why ABM?
Policy Issues in the Missile Defense Controversy ( New York
:
Pergamon Press, 1969), pp. 16-17.
12 George Rathjens and Jack Ruina, "BMD and Strategic
Instability," in P. Edward Haley and Jack Merrit, eds.,
Strategic Defense Initiative: Folly or Future ? (Boulder, CO:
Westview Press, 1986), p. 55.
13 Keith B. Payne and Colin S. Gray, "Nuclear Policy and
the Defensive Transition," Foreign Affairs
,
Vol. 62, No. 4,
Spring, 1984, p. 827.
deterrence through punishment has been emphasized in the West
over forty years, it has become "familiar." The assumed
"predictability" it imparts to extant and potential conflict
between the Soviet Union and the U.S. has resulted in its
identification as the only legitimate method of deterrence,
to the exclusion of defensive denial strategies. 14
One of the problems with a deterrent strategy which
excludes a defensive element is that, since it is not "likely
to work forever, " the consequences of its failure would be
intolerable for civilization. 15 Protection for the American
people and production base presently is "contingent on
successful counterforce second strikes, escalation control,
and a quick cease-fire, none of which holds much
promise. .. .this nation is naked to reciprocal assaults." 16
Although the situation in the Soviet Union is perhaps somewhat
more hopeful, if effective strategic defenses were
incorporated in the "balance of nuclear terror, " both the
chances and the threat of war could be reduced. 17 In the
absence of extensive, verifiable, enforced arms reduction
14 P. Edward Haley and Jack Merrit, eds., Strategic
Defense Initiative: Folly or Future ? (Boulder, CO: Westview
Press, 1986), pp. 1-2.
15 Payne and Gray, p. 820.
16 John M. Collins, The U.S. -Soviet Military Balance 1980-
1985 (Washington, DC: Pergamon-Brassey ' s, 1985), p. 60.
Edward L. Rowny, "SDI: Enhancing Security and
Stability," Department of State Bulletin , May, 1988, p. 26.
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agreements, and a substantially altered political climate,
there are few other ways to enhance deterrence.
The second way in which strategic defense operates comes
into effect if deterrence should fail. Not only can defenses
protect valuable assets such as population, retaliatory forces
or economic resources, they also exact a price from the
offense of the attacker. By forcing a buildup of the offense,
either qualitatively or quantitatively, defenses have diverted
an attacker's resources prior to an attack; once the attack
has commenced, defenses "absorb" part of the offense. 18
Lieutenant General James Abrahamson, former director of the
Strategic Defense Initiative Organization, states that an
effective defense must "be able to destroy a sufficient
portion of an aggressor's attacking forces to deny him
confidence in the outcome of an attack or deny an aggressor
the ability to destroy a militarily significant portion of the
target base he wishes to attack." 19
History has demonstrated that defense may eventually be
overcome, through technological advances or tactical or
strategic innovation, if an attacker is willing to "pay the
compound price in time and in assets to be expended." 20 This
18 Herzfeld, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 16-17.
19 James Abrahamson, "The SDI: Program and Rationale"
(excerpts from a statement to Congress, 9 May 1984), Survival
,
March/April, 1985, p. 82.
20 Gray, "The Transition from Offense to Defense," p. 60.
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is part of the dialectic explained above. Whatever resources
the attacker chooses to devote to thwarting them, defenses
have still cost him, in terms of increased masses of offensive
forces, time devoted to operations or research efforts,
numbers of personnel, manufacturing hours and so on devoted
to the effort. If the cost is judged too high by the
attacker, he will again be deterred.
The relative costs involved in defending and attacking
are a source of much disagreement. Cost estimations do not
take into account the value of that which is to be defended, 21
but are measures of how many offensive dollars it would take
to offset a given number of defensive dollars, or vice versa.
For instance, a British Air Ministry study in 1944 determined
that for every dollar the Germans spent on their V-ls, the
British spent four dollars to neutralize these flying bombs
with antiaircraft guns, barrage balloons, and fighter
aircraft. 22 How much human lives, the preservation of nature,
and manmade phenomena, whether art or science, are worth,
seldom enters into the calculations. At most, the value of
enhancing the survivability of retaliatory forces is
considered.
The cost of expanding the defense to deal with a given
increase in the size and cost of the offense is a measure of
21 Freedman, p. 13.
22 David Ritchie, Spacewar (New York: Athenum, 1982), p.
24.
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the leverage of the defense. The more specific an attacker's
objectives and the higher the confidence of success the
attacker requires, the greater the leverage exacted by the
defense. "If the defense has sufficiently high. .. leverage,
it can essentially preclude attacks." 23 And, "once the
defender has gained an. .. advantage, defense as such has done
its work," according to Clausewitz. 24 These relative costs of
offense and defense are invariably measured in terms of
dollars expended for one or the other, and formatted as a
ratio.
How effective must defenses be to "do their work"? This
is another point of contention. It is the opinion of former
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown that "a strategy of
deterrence based on defense would require that the defensive
systems work to near perfection, and that we have a very high
level of confidence that they will do so." 25 Many others,
however, believe that deterrence is enhanced by even partially
effective strategic defensive systems, because of the
uncertainty they inject into an attacker's plans. 26 An
attacker cannot be certain which, if any, of his weapons will
23 Fred S. Hoffman, "Ballistic Missile Defense and U.S.
National Security," in Haley and Merrit, p. 32.
24 Clausewitz, p. 370.
25 Harold Brown, "The Strategic Defense Initiative:
Defensive Systems and the Strategic Debate, " Survival
,
March/April, 1985, p. 56.
26 Rowny, p. 24.
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be able to penetrate defenses; this uncertainty forces him
either to expend a tremendous amount of resources to ensure
destruction of his target or to forego--or at least delay--
his attack. By denying the attacker confidence in his ability
to achieve his objectives, defenses "reinforce or help
maintain deterrence." 27
There are very few, if any, advocates of purely defensive
strategies. "One must assume that both the Soviet Union and
the U.S. prefer a condition wherein both their offensive and
their defensive capabilities are effective, to a condition
wherein only their defensive weapons can perform as
intended." 28 The Soviet Union places approximately as much
weight on its defensive forces as it does its offensive
capabilities; U.S. strategists are suggesting that the U.S.
base its posture on a "mix of offensive and defensive
systems." 29 A combination of offensive and defensive strategy
and capability may be the most effective deterrent in an age
of nuclear parity. 30
27 Hoffman, in Haley and Merrit, p. 30.
28 Payne and Gray, p. 842.
29 Discriminate Deterrence (Report of the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy), January, 1988, p. 2.
30 Huntington, in Kruzel, p. 42.
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C. HOW DEFENSES WORK
Defenses work in one of two ways. First, they can be
passive. Passive defenses are characterized by their lack of
active contact with the enemy. They might consist of
something as simple as a geographic location which provides
a nation with natural defenses such as mountains or an
inhospitable coastline. 31 Passive defenses can also protect
potential targets through warning, mobility, concealment,
sheltering, dispersal, hardening, and proliferation. When
designed to protect the general population, passive defenses
are called "civil defense, " but passive measure can be used
to protect military assets as well. Hardening, for instance,
might involve making a missile silo resistant to the direct
effects of nuclear weapons. Warning enables aircraft to
escape vulnerable bases; ground forces can disperse from
barracks or other installations. 32 Dispersal, or evacuation,
and sheltering are the most common forms of civil defense.
In contrast, active defenses involve interception of an
attacker or his offensive weapons 33 in order to destroy or
render ineffective those weapons. Interception is effected
either in space or in the atmosphere by means of aircraft,
31 Freedman, p. 8.
32 Leon Sloss, "The Strategist's Perspective," in Ashton
B. Carter and David Schwartz, Ballistic Missile Defense
(Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1984), p. 36.
33 Sloss, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 36.
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missiles, or other more exotic defensive weapons. 34 There are
currently two basic types of active defense, antiaircraft
defense and antiballistic missile defense. Antiaircraft
defenses, or simply "air defenses," are designed to intercept
bombers or other airbreathers, such as cruise missiles.
Antiballistic missile defenses are intended to intercept
intercontinental ballistic missiles and sea-launched ballistic
missiles. 35
D. DEFENSE AS A FUNCTION
Active defenses can also be divided into categories
according to what they are specifically intended to defend.
Sometimes point defense, or defense of weapons, and area
defense, or defense of cities, are terms used to describe
these defensive functions. There is, however, no clear
dividing line between these artificially imposed categories.
For instance, point defense is defined as the use of defensive
weapons "to defend a limited geographic area, such as a
missile silo, against attacking missiles." 36 An area defense
might be designed to protect a city or even an entire
country. 37 But how limited must the area defended be in order
34 Zbignew Brzezinski, ed. , Promise or Peril (Washington,
DC: Ethics and Public Policy Center, 1986), p. 457.
35 Sloss, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 36.
36 Brzezinski, Promise or Peril
,
p. 463.
Stephen Weiner, "Systems and Technology, " in Carter
and Schwartz, p. 75.
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for defenses to be characterized as "point defense"? As the
range of interceptors increases and thereby fuzzes the
distinction between point and area capabilities, these
definitions become increasingly inconsequential. There may
be great overlap between the two, especially when cities and
weapons are in close proximity.
Again, intentions may be the key to distinguishing these
types of defense. If antiballistic missile defense is
intended to protect primarily missile silos, it could be
described as point defense, even though city defense might be
a collateral effect of such defense. If an area defense is
deployed to defend mainly cities, it may coincidentally
prevent offensive weapons from destroying missile silos.
Active defenses are also described in terms of the point
in an offensive weapon's trajectory in which it is
intercepted. These distinctions are most commonly applied to
antiballistic missile defensive systems, which might intercept
a missile during the boost, post-boost, midcourse, and
terminal phases of its flight.
The most useful distinctions may be those that describe
function as what defense defends against, rather than what it
defends. To this end, for purposes of this thesis, the terms
antiballistic missile defense and antiaircraft will be used
as defined above, without particular regard for what these
systems are defending except where necessary to clarify an
essential point.
17
III. THE EVOLUTION OF U.S. DEFENSIVE DOCTRINE
A. BACKGROUND
About ten years ago, on NATO's thirtieth anniversary,
Henry Kissinger commented on the unique position the U.S. had
taken on strategic defenses. "It cannot have been often in
history, " he said, "that it was considered an advantageous
military doctrine to make your own country deliberately
vulnerable." 38 Yet, this is exactly the course the U.S. has
pursued through much of the post-World War II era, and the
strategic policy it continues to adhere to today. Air Force
Chief of Staff General Larry D. Welch comments that "This
tremendous opposition to introducing a defensive element to
the U.S. deterrent strategy has to be one of the most
mysterious pieces of political chemistry we've seen." 39
Where does this opposition originate? It is certainly
not a popular idea with the American public, over half of whom
(64%) are under the impression that the U.S. has already
implemented strategic defensive systems. In fact, recent
polls demonstrate that fully 90% of Americans, an increase of
Henry A. Kissinger, "NATO: The Next Thirty Years,
"
Survival
, November/December, 1979, p. 265.
39
"Curious Chem
September 1988, p. 22.
istry," The Wall Street Journal, 30
18
15% over figures from merely four years earlier, 4 "want the
U.S. Government to protect America against Soviet missiles." 41
Harold Brown, Secretary of Defense under President Carter,
notes that "presidents and all Americans are fundamentally
dissatisfied with the fact that U.S. nuclear strategy depends
on rational decisions by the Soviet Union, with the
possibility that this nuclear strategy might fail, and the
consequences that would follow." 42
The defensive element has not always been absent from U.S.
strategy. In fact, one of the earliest American warfighting
doctrines relied almost exclusively on defensive measures.
During the American Revolution, George Washington adopted a
strategic defensive strategy; because his armies were so weak,
Washington was unable to pursue an offensive strategy. 43 By
maintaining both a tactical and a strategic defensive, he
hoped to resist successfully whatever forces the British might
mobilize against his relatively poorly equipped and trained
troops. 44 Although fairly well isolated by vast oceans, the
40 William R. Van Cleave, Fortress USSR (Stanford, CA:
Hoover Institution Press, 1986), p. 40.
41 William F. Buckley, "What's Going On?" National Review
,
30 September 1988, p. 64.
42 Harold Brown, "The Strategic Defense Initiative:
Defensive Systems and the Strategic Debate, " Survival
,
March/April, 1985, p. 56.
Russell F. Weigley, The American Way of War
(Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press, 1973), p. 5.
44 Weigley, p. 9.
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U.S. maintained coastal artillery positions until well into
this century, in spite of the fact that few adversaries were
capable of projecting aggression against American shores.
However, in what can only be described as a peculiarly inverse
relationship, it seems that as the ability of opponents to
threaten directly the North American continent has increased,
American defensive capabilities have decreased.
B. U.S. DEFENSIVE STRATEGY THROUGH WORLD WAR II
Through the first half of the twentieth century, when many
countries found their national territories subject to the
terrible destruction of two world wars, the U.S. faced few
direct threats to its exercise of sovereignty over American
soil and airspace. During World War II, attacks on the
continental U.S. consisted of "two landings of saboteurs by
U-boat, a single shelling of a West Coast oil refinery by a
Japanese submarine, and a pathetic strategic bombing by
balloon (wiping out a Sunday-school picnic in Oregon)." 45 The
Germans had plans to bombard New York, using pilots who would
bail out and be picked up by submarine, but the war was over
before these attacks could be carried out. 46
The U.S., however, was prepared to defend itself in the
event immediate threats evolved. During the late 1930s, the
45 B. Bruce-Biggs, The Shield of Faith (New York: Simon
and Schuster, Inc., 1988), p. 30.
46 Bruce-Biggs, p. 41.
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Joint Army and Navy Board had revised Plan Orange, originally
developed immediately following the first world war, to
include a defensive effort in the Pacific. This plan
incorporated a triangular "position of readiness" that ranged
from Alaska to Hawaii to Panama. In 1939, "Rainbow Plans"
which assumed a threat from Germany were formulated; they
contained provisions for the defense of the Western
Hemisphere. 47
Once the U.S. entered World War II, a strategic defensive
effort was quickly implemented. Coastal radars, interceptor
squadrons, and antiaircraft guns were supplemented with
hundreds of thousands of civilian ground observers who had
been recruited to identify incoming aircraft. 48 The threats
which these measures were intended to counter never
materialized, and, with minor exceptions, the U.S. defensive
effort has since been permitted to atrophy.
C. THE LATE 1940S
In the years immediately following the war, U.S. defense
deployments declined, at least in part as a result of the lack
of a significant strategic threat. In addition,
demobilization drastically reduced the numbers of personnel
in the U.S.'s armed forces. While the U.S. possessed only a
47 James Chace and Caleb Carr, America Invulnerable (New
York: Summit Books, 1988), pp. 213-214.
48 Bruce-Biggs, pp. 28-29.
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limited number of nuclear weapons and few delivery vehicles
at this time, no other nation had yet developed a similar
capability to project so much power over such great distances.
The U.S.'s geographic isolation continued to serve as an
effective means of passive defense during this period of U.S.
nuclear superiority. As Richard Pipes has noted, "America has
tended to rely on its insularity to protect it from
aggressors, and on its unique industrial capacity to help
crush its enemies once war was underway." 49
During the immediate postwar period, the Soviet Union was
not viewed as an imminent nuclear threat. Not only did the
Soviets lack the technology necessary to produce deliverable
nuclear weapons at that time, they were also occupied with
recovering from the ravages the Nazis had caused. In the
U.S., few were concerned with U.S. vulnerability, and many
believed that an "effective antidote" to the bomb would
eventually be discovered. President Truman, in a speech to
Congress on 23 October 1945, said "Every new weapon will
eventually bring some counter defence to it." 50 Although
Soviets and Americans had recently been allies and
successfully defeated adversaries in both Europe and Asia, the
U.S. had still not decided exactly what its attitude toward
the Soviet Union should be. There were proposals for
49 Richard Pipes, "Why the Soviet Union Thinks It Can
Fight and Win a Nuclear War," Commentary
,
July, 1977, p. 22.
50 Lawrence Freedman, p. 30.
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cooperation with the Soviets coming from some sectors, and
warnings against "foolish gestures of trust" from others. 1
Those who looked to the future did not allow themselves
to slip into complacency during this period of offensive
superiority. Anticipated threats were examined; a board of
scientists recommended the concept of antiballistic missile
defenses to the Army as early as 1946, 52 when Thumper and
Wizard research projects were initiated to examine the
technical feasibility of ballistic missile defense. 53 The
Army's Project Thumper, under contract with General Electric,
was rejected as technologically impossible; the Air Force's
Wizard program was similarly discontinued in the late 1940s. 54
Since no U.S. adversary possessed intercontinental ballistic
missiles, no urgent requirement to develop such a defensive
capability existed at that time.
The Thumper and Wizard projects had been derived from
existing air defense research efforts. The Soviet Union,
decidedly making the transition from ally to opponent, was
developing nuclear weapons and the long-range bombers
51 McGeorge Bundy, Danger and Survival (New York: Random
House, 1988), p. 178.
52 Fred Kaplan, The Wizards of Armageddon (New York:
Simon and Schuster, 1983), p. 343.
53 David N. Schwartz, "Past and Present: The Historical
Legacy," in Carter and Schwartz, p. 331; and David S. Yost,
Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western Alliance
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1988), p. 316.
54 Bruce-Biggs, p. 102.
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necessary to deliver them to U.S. territory. 55 These two
emerging Soviet capabilities triggered a U.S. continental air
defense effort that flourished in the early and mid-1950s. 56
The Lincoln Summer Study of 1952 examined a proposal by
scientists at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology and
elsewhere to build a highly effective air defense system, and
recommended the construction of a large and costly air defense
control system to protect U.S. cities against the Soviet
bomber threat. Eerily foreshadowing a similar perceived need
that would arise in the 1980s, the Study's proposal would have
required leakproof antiaircraft defenses. Such defenses were
technologically infeasible during the late 1940s and early
1950s, 57 as they may still be in the 1990s.
The North American Air Defense Command, derived from the
Air Defense Command which had been organized in 1946, was
established during this period, as were two early warning
radar lines across Canada. A large number of interceptor
squadrons were also deployed, and antiaircraft batteries were
positioned near probable targets. These capabilities were
generated largely as a result of a lobbying effort conducted
by a coalition of nuclear scientists, military officers,
55 William J. Broad, "Star Wars Traced to Eisenhower Era,"
New York Times
, 28 October 1986, p. C3
.
56 Huntington, in Kruzel, p. 24.
57 Henry S. Rowen, "The Evolution of Strategic Nuclear
Doctrine, " in Laurence Martin, Strategic Thought in the
Nuclear Age (London: Heineman, 1979), p. 138.
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civilian officials, and legislators in response to Soviet
offensive developments. 58
D. THE EISENHOWER ADMINISTRATION
During the Eisenhower Administration, U.S. strategy
continued to emphasize superiority. Both strategy and forces
were deterrence-oriented, with emphasis on the nuclear
umbrella the U.S. was able to provide for its allies. 59
Eisenhower relied on the nuclear threat of existential
deterrence, which means that through their mere existence,
nuclear weapons deter. The inference was that "conventional
warfare had become all but unacceptable to the U.S., which had
the great advantage of possessing nuclear weapons, " in
themselves enough to counter superior Soviet manpower or any
other military assets the Soviets might boast. 60 Eisenhower
argued that there was no defense against nuclear weapons, and
his secretary of state, John Foster Dulles, proclaimed the
doctrine of massive retaliation: the United States would
"depend primarily upon a great capacity to retaliate,
58 Huntington, in Kruzel, p. 24.
59 U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of
Defense Melvin R. Laird Before the Senate Armed Services
Committee on the Fiscal Year 1972-1976 Defense Program and the
1972 Defense Budget (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
Office, 15 March 1971), p. 72.
60 John Newhouse, War and Peace in the Nuclear Age (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1989), p. 91.
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instantly, by means and at places of our own choosing." 1
Although Dulles later explained that he had intended massive
retaliation to be just one option among many in a strategy of
flexible retaliation, 62 the idea was to make war so horrifying
that it became "unthinkable."
Although nuclear offensive capabilities were emphasized
at the time, this was not to the exclusion of strategic
defenses. Between 1953 and 1958, the U.S. made a "sincere (if
low-budget) effort to defend the country," particularly under
the auspices of the Nike program. 63 Over 4,000 Nike-Ajax
missiles were deployed in the continental U.S. by the Army
beginning in 1953, as part of an air defense system that was
eventually turned over to the National Guard. 64 The Nike
interceptor, intended to help the Army fulfill the point-
defense-only mission it had been given at Key West in 1947, 65
was designed to explode upon striking bombers. 66
In 1958, the U.S. began deployment of a follow-on, the
Nike-Hercules, as antiaircraft guns were being phased out for
replacement with Nike-Ajax. When deployment of the Nike-Ajax
61 Pipes, p. 23.
62 Freedman, The Evolution of Nuclear Strategy
, p. 76.
63 Angelo Codevilla, While Others Build (New York: The
Free Press, 1988), p. 5.
64 Bruce-Biggs, p. 67.
65 Bruce-Biggs, p. 48.
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itself was discontinued in 1963, all air-defense batteries
from that point on were fitted with the Nike-Hercules. 67 In
spite of the widespread deployment of the Hercules, it had two
shortcomings: its accuracy rapidly degenerated at altitudes
of less than 500 feet, so that at an altitude of under 200
feet it was worthless, and it could only operate when it was
able to maintain a line-of-sight on its target. In order to
fill this low-altitude gap in antiaircraft defense coverage,
the HAWK (for "Homing-All-the-Way-Killer" ) missile was
developed. The HAWK, mounted on a small launcher that could
be swung toward an incoming target, was never deployed for
defense of the continental U.S., however. 68
By 1956, Bell Labs had declared antiballistic missile
systems technically feasible, and the Army and the Pentagon's
research and development director ordered development of an
ABM system which they named Nike II or Nike-Zeus. 69 Research
on Nike-Zeus, fuelled by evidence that the Soviets were
developing intercontinental ballistic missiles, 70 resulted in
a terminal/late mid-course defensive system71 that included
"batteries of interceptor missiles and a set of huge radars
67 Bruce-Biggs, p. 93.
Bruce-Biggs, p. 94.
69 Kaplan, p. 343.
70 Huntington, in Kruzel, p. 24.
71 William Schneider, Jr., "Missile Defense Systems:
Past, Present, and Future," in Hoist and Schneider, p. 4.
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that would track incoming enemy warheads and guide the
interceptors to destroy them in their path with a nuclear
explosion." 72 Nike-Zeus was intended to counter not only
ballistic missiles, but cruise missiles and high-flying
aircraft as well, but its range was limited to 100 miles,
since that had been defined as the cut-off point for the
Army's point defense role. 73
Army and Air Force programs often overlapped during this
period. The National Security Act of 1947, which had
reorganized the military, mandated creation of the Air Force
as a separate service, but did little to define the roles and
missions of the services. 74 Both the Army and the Air Force
had a substantial stake in defenses, and consequently pursued
surface-to-air missile projects. The Air Force, however,
"jealous that the Army had flying things to shoot down
airplanes, " had subsequently lobbied successfully to restrict
the operating altitude of the Army's missiles. 75
In 1962, about five years after the Soviet Union had
tested its first ICBM, Nike-Zeus completed its first
successful interceptions. 76 The interception problem, which
72 Kaplan, p. 343.
73 Bruce-Biggs, pp. 105 and 107.
74 Newhouse, p. 70.
75 Codevilla, pp. 38-39.
76 Schneider, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 4.
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Bell Labs had found to be the most difficult task for the
system to fulfill, was eased but not solved by the one-megaton
warhead the interceptor missiles carried. About one-third of
the test interceptions attempted were failures; 7 the system
was limited by the relatively slow speed of the interceptors
(about one-quarter that of an incoming ICBM) and restrictions
imposed by mechanically steered radars. 78 Nike-Zeus was judged
not effective enough to be deployed. 79
Development by the Soviet of an intercontinental ballistic
missile capability had several impacts on U.S. defensive
programs. First, the Eisenhower Administration cut back on
defenses against bombers. Second, it upgraded the Nike
program, as described above, in an attempt to counter the new
threat. And, finally, it initiated Project Defender to
explore exotic new antimissile technologies, 80 in a move that
has been characterized as the beginning of the subsidized,
pseudotechnical U.S. strategic defense debate that continues
today. 81
Project Defender was a crash program in ballistic missile
defense. It included studies of non-nuclear ABMs to protect
Broad, "Star Wars Traced to Eisenhower Era," p. C3.
78 Schneider, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 4.
79 Schneider, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 5.
80 Broad, "Star Wars Traced to Eisenhower Era," p. C3.
81 Codevilla, p. 5.
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cities; ultra-high-acceleration ABMs, like Hibex; non-nuclear
space-based interceptors launched from satellites; and ABMs
with multiple one-pound, heat-seeking warheads for mid-course
defense. SPAD, for Space Patrol Active Defense, which would
have killed enemy boosters and post-boost vehicles with a
three-pound "spinning spider web" 60-100 feet in diameter and
strung with tiny steel pellets, was tested. 82
These efforts of the Eisenhower Administration provoked
the first U.S. ABM debate. In the spring of 1958, a report
submitted by a panel of engineers and other technicians in the
Pentagon maintained that Nike-Zeus simply would not work
against a dedicated enemy attack because it could be saturated
too easily. The panel, called the Reentry Body Identification
Group, also discovered other, even simpler ways to defeat
Nike-Zeus. Disabling the system's tracking radars, which were
so vulnerable that a 100, 000-kiloton blast two miles distant
could blind them, could render the entire system useless.
Decoys, which the system was unable to distinguish from
warheads, could trick the system into firing off all of its
interceptors. By November, 1961, President Kennedy had heard
enough about Nike-Zeus' s weaknesses to decide against
deployment of the system. 83
82 John Bosma, "Arms Control, SDI, and the Geneva
Convention," in Brzezinski, p. 358.
83 Kaplan, pp. 343-345.
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Although some of the other ABM projects initiated during
this period showed great promise, especially if deployed in
numbers significant enough to complicate enemy attacks, 84 only
components of the systems developed at this time would ever
be used in active defense of the U.S.
E. THE 1960S AND MCNAMARA
In 1961, with the Kennedy Administration in office, the
emphasis of U.S. strategic thought changed. Although much
attention was diverted from nuclear weapons and directed
toward conventional and unconventional warfare, 85 the strategy
of flexible response was during this time. As Soviet nuclear
capabilities increased, this strategy was intended to give the
President alternatives other than the "suicide or surrender"
options massive retaliation provided. In particular, massive
retaliation did not give Kennedy the ability to deter
revolutionary movements or wars of liberation. The concept
of flexible response revolved around matching the "potential
range of challenge with a correspondingly broad range of
options." 86 The U.S. intended to be able to respond anyplace,
anytime, with weapons and forces appropriate to the situation.
The new administration's Secretary of Defense, Robert
McNamara, originally endorsed Nike-Zeus, although on a
84 Huntington, in Kruzel, p. 24.
85 Bruce-Biggs, p. 160.
86 Newhouse, p. 163.
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considerably smaller scale than the Army advocated. McNamara
was willing to consider deployment of 1,200 missiles in 12
batteries to defend six cities. The Army wanted 70 batteries,
a total of 7,000 missiles, to protect 27 areas in the U.S. and
Canada. 87 McNamara refused to put Nike into production. As
indicated above, he felt it could not be effective enough to
justify its cost. 88 McNamara maintained that Nike-Zeus could
never defend against a massive Soviet attack, but he was
willing to accept a limited deployment. A small deployment
might increase Soviet uncertainty, and help to deter an
attack; it might also protect the U.S. from accidental attacks
or discourage "nuclear blackmail" by smaller powers. 89
McNamara, in fact, was taking U.S. strategic doctrine in
a wholly new direction. Initially a supporter of strategic
defensive efforts, he advocated measures to ensure the
invulnerability of second-strike forces, and was responsible
for ordering the commencement of construction of facilities
at Cheyenne Mountain. During the first two years of his
tenure, he supported a city-avoidance targeting policy, and
tailored U.S. forces to fit this strategy. 90 McNamara hoped
that this policy could protect the cities on both sides by
87 Kaplan, p. 345.
88 Weigley. p. 448.
89 Kaplan, p. 345.
90 Newhouse, pp. 163-164; and Bruce-Biggs, p. 156.
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giving an adversary the "strongest imaginable incentive to
refrain from striking our own cities." 91
McNamara subsequently set the U.S. on a course that would
lead to the total devaluation of strategic defense as a
component of national strategy. After 1963, overwhelming
significance was again placed on the U.S. nuclear arsenal,
under the guise of Assured Destruction. McNamara' s thinking
about nuclear warfare had changed. He anticipated the advent
of circumstances that would enable both sides to deliver
devastating retaliatory attacks regardless of damage-
limitation measures. Escalation and mutual destruction in
general nuclear war were inevitable. 92
Originally a simple analytical tool to help assess
strategic force adequacy, the concept of assured destruction
became the principal criterion of this adequacy, the dominant
strategic concept, and finally a philosophy of mutual
deterrence stability. Analyses which compared the cost of
protecting populations to the cost of destroying them,
assuming that people were the object of the attack and not
"collateral damage, " showed the defense to be at a cost
disadvantage. Although some experts contend that the costs
of ballistic missile defense, expressed as a ratio of the
costs of defense to cost of offsetting the missile had dropped
91 Bundy, p. 545.
92 Bundy, pp. 547-548 and 566.
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during the 1960s "from 20:1 to ... somewhere closer to parity,
where the advantage was arguable," 93 McNamara's figures showed
that it was still about three times more expensive to defend
than to destroy. 94 Strategic stability was transformed from
a condition into a military asset, and the "amazing theory"
that vulnerability contributed to peace and invulnerability
contributed to the risks of war began to unfold. 95
Deterrent policy was predicated on the virtues of U.S. and
Soviet vulnerability to nuclear attack, and deterrence
stability was seen as a function of mutual vulnerability. 96
McNamara persuaded President Johnson that damage- limiting on
a large scale should not be pursued. 97 Damage limitation,
which McNamara applied to cities vice military forces,
consisted of implementation of civil defense measures, ABMs,
and city-avoidance targeting, none of which "worked" as far
as McNamara was concerned. McNamara was changing his mind
about the wisdom of ABMs in general, but there were pressures
from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and their allies on Capitol
Hill for some type of protection from enemy ballistic
93 Van Cleave, p. 9.
94 Rowen, in Martin, p. 146.
95 Kissinger, p. 265.
96 Robert M. Soofer, "SDI and Deterrence: A Western
European Perspective," Comparative Strategy , Vol. 7, No. 1,
1988, p. 18.
97 Rowan, in Martin, p. 146.
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missiles. McNamara was finding it politically impossible to
kill the Nike program outright, so he attempted to stem off
deployment by allocating large sums of money for research and
development. Almost $500 million per year was dedicated to
Nike, but none of these funds were for production of the
system.
By this time, the Army had improved Nike-Zeus. Research
on Nike-X, which came to include the concept of layered, area
defense, had begun in 1962. 98 The new proposal incorporated
phased-array radar, which could scan wider areas of the sky,
and a dual missile system that included both the long-range
Spartan and the short-range Sprint.
Spartan, a three-stage missile, would be launched to
destroy enemy missiles at a safe distance from their targets,
in order to spare the targets the effects of fallout from
Spartan's nuclear warhead. A kill of the enemy missile could
be effected in several ways: Spartan could knock the missile
off-course, blow it up, or destroy its guidance systems with
radiation from its fireball. Any incoming missiles that
Spartan failed to intercept would be targeted by the smaller,
faster Sprint interceptor, which would explode in their path
to knock them down or incinerate them in midair. Because the
resulting explosion was bound to harm nearby population
QQ
Schneider, in Hoist and Schneider, pp. 5-6.
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centers with adverse nuclear effects, Sprint was the "defense
of last resort." 99
Scientists pointed out this attempt at a layered defense
did not remedy any of Nike-Zeus 's shortcomings, 100 and the
entire antimissile effort came under fire from critics who
maintained that the enemy would always find it cheaper and
easier to outwit antimissile systems than it was for the U.S.
to build them. 101 Nike-X was eventually considered for both
light and heavy deployment by the Johnson Administration, but
it was never deployed, nor approved for deployment: it was
declared too expensive and not effective enough, 102 and it
remained at the research and development stage.
In 1967, pressures from two directions reached a critical
point. First, domestic political pressure, especially from
Congress, demanded that some type of ABM be deployed. 103 And
second, the Johnson Administration was faced with indisputable
evidence that the Soviet Union was mounting its own extensive
antimissile effort. 104 The Soviet effort was disconcerting
because of its potential to upset the carefully crafted
99 Ritchie, pp. 87-88.
100 Kaplan, p. 345.
101 Broad, "Star Wars Traced to Eisenhower Era," p. C3.
102 Schneider, in Schneider and Hoist, pp. 6-7.
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nuclear balance the U.S. had strived to achieve. Soviet ABM
systems might upset the nuclear balance by giving Soviet
missiles and cities a high degree of invulnerability, 105
thereby destroying the foundations of Mutual Assured
Destruction.
The current state of technology made McNamara skeptical
about what either the Soviets or the U.S. could accomplish
with ABMs. He believed that deployment of ABMs might set off
an offensive arms race, a race to build weapons that could
overcome ABM defenses. 106 Under orders from Johnson in 1967,
however, McNamara was forced to fund production of Nike-X.
McNamara was determined to do so in a way that would retard
efforts to expand production into a full-scale nationwide
defensive system. 107 Perhaps deliberately, he choose the
weakest possible rationale for deploying an ABM, 108 a rationale
that would support only limited deployment.
The Chinese Communists had successfully tested a
thermonuclear device in May, 1966, and McNamara used China's
marginal nuclear capability as his excuse. He announced
Sentinel, as Nike-X had been renamed, an explicitly anti-
Chinese, city-defending ABM, in a speech to editors and
105 Weigley, p. 471.
106 Weigley, p. 471.
107 Kaplan, p. 346.
108 Weigley, p. 471.
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publishers in San Francisco on 18 September 1967. 109 Sentinel,
managed by the Army, was designed to protect the entire U.S.,
including Alaska and Hawaii. 110
Plans for Sentinel were optimized to meet only a threat
from China; for example, its radars had no southward-looking
faces. 111 As a nationwide, thin, area defense, Sentinel would
not only thwart Chinese attacks, but also counter accidental
and unauthorized launches. In theory, it could be expanded
to protect retaliatory forces as well, but McNamara emphasized
for the benefit of the Soviet Union that Sentinel was not
intended to blunt the effects of a Soviet attack. 112 Against
a "primitive" attack, Sentinel was expected to hold U.S.
fatalities below one million; against a Soviet attack,
deployment of an ABM would be a "futile waste of our
resources. ,l113
By this time, McNamara had injected the element of
mutuality in his Assured Destruction formulations by making
109 Kaplan, p. 346.
110 U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary
of Defense Clark M. Clifford: The Fiscal Year 1970-1974
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some explicit assumptions about the Soviet Union. He believed
that all "reasonable men" could be persuaded to see things
from his, and by extension, the U.S.'s, point of view.
Specifically, he decided that what would deter the U.S. would
also deter the Soviets, and that what deters could be
quantified. He judged that "a capability on our part to
destroy. . .one-fifth to one-fourth of her population and one-
half of her industrial capacity would serve as an effective
deterrent" to the Soviet Union. 114
The flip side of the mutual ability of adversaries to
destroy each other is their mutual vulnerability. Any efforts
to impede the ability to destroy by definition reduce
vulnerability. In order to overcome the effects of one
nation's damage- limiting measures, that nation's adversary
would be forced to build up its offense; thus, defenses did
nothing more than fuel an offensive arms race. McNamara
explained his theory in his final report as Secretary of
Defense to the Congress: "It is precisely this mutual
capacity to destroy one another, and conversely, our
respective inability to prevent such destruction, that
provides us both with the strongest possible motive to avoid
114 Robert S. McNamara, "Hearings on Military Posture
Before the U.S. Congress, in P. Edward Haley, David M.
Keithly, and Jack Merritt, Nuclear Strategy, Arms Control, and
the Future (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1985), p. 88.
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a strategic nuclear war." 115 "[T]o feel secure, the U.S.
actually required the Soviet Union to have the capacity to
destroy it." 116
While McNamara was developing the concept of Mutual
Assured Destruction, opposition to ABM deployment had
surfaced, originally in academic circles. 117 During this
period, the Soviet Union had achieved the ability to destroy
the U.S., just as Mutual Assured Destruction required.
Defenses were suddenly perceived to be destabilizing, and
congressional opposition to ABMs materialized. 118 On 6
February 1969, a new Administration ordered a freeze on
Sentinel construction pending a review of the situation. 119
The McNamara regime had also had an impact on antiaircraft
defenses. While most of the attention had been given to the
high-visibility ABM debate for the past decade, antiaircraft
defenses had not flourished during this period of relative
inattention. On the contrary, the fate of antiaircraft
defenses was tied irrevocably to that of the ABM. "No air
defense system can provide significant * Damage Limiting'
capabilities against the USSR unless accompanied by a strong,
115 U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of
Defense Robert S. McNamara. .. 1969 Defense Budget
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effective ABM, " the annual reports of the Secretary of Defense
asserted. 120 Just like Sentinel, air defense systems could be
effective against limited attacks, but funds were allocated
for research and development of these defenses only.
Modernization was put on hold. The U.S. Continental Air
Defense maintained sixteen battalions of Nike-Hercules
surface-to-air missiles, two Hawk batteries (for field army
defense), 188 long-range Bomarc missiles, and 1,250 fighter-
interceptor aircraft; there were 80,000 personnel assigned to
the U.S. Air Defense Command in 1969. 121 In 1970, reduction
of these defensive forces began. 122 The U.S. was abandoning
air defense on the premise that it is not useful in the
123
absence of missile defense.
F. THE NIXON ADMINISTRATION
In his first presidential press conference on 27 January
1969, Nixon announced his Administration's goals. Although
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he had campaigned on a platform of superiority, he now reduced
somewhat his requirements for offensive forces to
"sufficiency." A sufficient deterrent, according to Nixon,
was one that combined a capability to inflict Assured
Destruction on the Soviet Union with a guarantee against the
Soviet Union's development of an ability to inflict
appreciably more damage on the U.S. than the U.S. could
inflict on the Soviet Union. The ability of the Soviets to
threaten was increasing: the Soviet arsenal was growing in
size, and its accuracy was improving. "Sufficient" U.S.
capabilities were also intended to deny other, smaller powers,
such as China, the ability to damage the U.S. 124 Nixon tried
to bring operational and declaratory policies together, and
ensure that the U.S. could not only threaten but also actually
fight a war.
Nixon had also concluded that there was more than enough
evidence that the Soviet Union might not intend to observe the
rules the U.S. had laid down for bilateral Mutual Assured
Destruction. 125 Early in his term, Nixon consequently sent
one of his advisors, Henry Kissinger, to the Pentagon, with
a message. "Explicitly speaking for the President," Kissinger
gave the Department of Defense its orders. There was to be
an ABM, it would be cheaper than the previous, Democratic
124 Weigley, pp. 470-471.
125 Van Cleave, p. 12.
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Administration's ABM, and this new ABM would shoot down Soviet
missiles, not just China's. When these directions were passed
on to the Pentagon's research and development director, he
concluded that city defense was impossible under the spending
constraints that had been imposed along with the expanded ABM
mission. The U.S. was therefore going to gear its ABM toward
defending Minuteman silos. ICBMs were less valuable than
cities, so their defense would not have to be completely
leakproof . 126 The new ABM was to be consistent with extant
technology.
Without any accompanying technological changes in its
component parts, Sentinel's objectives and character had been
redefined, and its name was replaced as well. Nixon announced
his intention to deploy Safeguard to protect U.S. strategic
forces on 14 March 1969. 127 In some circles, this was not a
particularly popular decision. Safeguard barely managed to
survive necessary Congressional votes: in the summer of 1969,
it went forward only after a 50-50 vote in the Senate failed
to remove it from an authorization bill. 128
Nike-X components, originally designed for city defense,
were to be used for the Safeguard system. 129 Although these
126 Kaplan, p. 350.
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components were "large, cumbersome, and costly" for the
system's new mission, 130 they helped keep Safeguard within the
budget constraints the Administration insisted on.
It had been decided that Safeguard would be deployed in
phases. Initially, it would defend two ICBM sites, at Grand
Forks, North Dakota, and Malmstrom, Montana. After a
reevaluation of the threat, follow-on deployments would be
determined. The second phase therefore consisted of three
options. The first option included defense of two additional
Minuteman wings, a heavier complement of Sprint missiles at
existing Safeguard sites, and defense of Washington, D.C. The
second option would have provided defense for the U.S. bomber
force. The third option was for area defense of cities. 131
Although ABM defense of Minuteman was Safeguard's highest
priority, Nixon personally felt strongly committed to the
third option. "No president, with responsibility for the
lives and safety of the American people, " he contended, "could
fail to provide such protection." 132
Nixon had already done more than any of his predecessors
for ABM defense. Prior to Safeguard, research, development,
testing, and some prototypes had comprised the entire
130 William A. Davis, Jr., Asymmetries in U.S. and Soviet
Strategic Defense Programs: Implications for Near-Term
American Deployment Options (Washington, DC: Pergamon-
Brassey's, 1986), p. 55.
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antimissile effort. But in 1970, engineers prepared to "bend
metal" for the new system, 133 despite criticisms that none of
the previous vulnerabilities had been remedied. 134
The honeymoon was not to last, however. In September,
1969, the Soviet Union had surpassed the U.S. in the number
of land-based ICBMs deployed, 135 and by the end of that year,
the two nations had commenced Strategic Arms Limitations
Talks. As it entered negotiations, the U.S. planned the
extensive ABM deployment described above. Early in the talks,
Safeguard's area defense component was dropped, and the U.S.
subsequently lowered its requirements from the four sites
Congress had already approved, to three, two, one, and then,
by the time the talks were concluded, none. 136
G. THE ANTIBALLISTIC MISSILE TREATY
The purpose of SALT, for the U.S., at least, was to
twofold. First, it was an attempt to reduce the likelihood
of strategic nuclear war between the U.S. and the Soviet
Union. Second, it was intended to preserve U.S. strategic
sufficiency through negotiations, rather than through
133 Broad, "Star Wars Traced to Eisenhower Era," p. C3
.
134 Kaplan, p. 351.
135 Weigley, p. 472.
136 Van Cleave, p. 13.
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competition in an arms race. 137 Soviet observers noted that
"U.S. strategic planners assumed that the deployment of any
ballistic missile defense system (whether for territorial,
area, or point defense) would compel the USSR to build up its
offensive arsenal to a level that would enable it to inflict
the intended damage on the U.S., the cost on the Soviet side
being significantly lower than the price the US would have to
pay for deploying its BMD systems. 138
An agreement would relieve fiscal pressures the U.S. was
experiencing in its endeavor to maintain "sufficiency."
According to one observer, the U.S. SALT proposal "seems to
have been highly influenced by an attempt to forestall heavy
domestic investment in an ABM system of questionable
effectiveness." 139 The combination of budgetary and
technological constraints may have driven U.S. negotiations.
Robert McFarlane notes that the treaty reflected for America
"the practical reality that the state of the art in defensive
technologies made effective defense infeasible.
"
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SALT continued into 1972, when a compromise was finally
reached on 22 May. The Soviets had altered their original
position, and were unwilling to give up all ABM capabilities,
so it was decided that each side would be permitted two sites:
one for protection of its National Command Authority, and a
second to defend a single strategic offensive forces site.
This second site was to located not less than 1300 kilometers
from the first. 141
On 26 May 1972, the ABM Treaty was finally signed. A
subsequent protocol agreement signed in 1974 reduced the
number sites permitted from two to one. The treaty primarily
limited deployment quantities: the number of launchers and
interceptor missiles at that one site was restricted to one
hundred of each, and the number of radars similarly regulated.
There were no restrictions on research and development. 142
Obviously, the treaty left each side with little protection
against incoming enemy ballistic missiles. The one hundred
interceptor missiles permitted could not defend more than a
fraction of either nation's deployed ICBMs; even if the system
were to operate perfectly, it could destroy only one hundred
out of the thousands of attacking warheads. 143
141 Deane, pp. 51-52.
142 Davis, p. 25.
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After the protocol was signed, the U.S.'s Malmstrom site,
already under construction, was subjected to "one of the most
elaborate processes of demolition in the history of military
construction. .. in order to leave no doubt that the site had
been obliterated. " 144 The ABM site at Grand Forks was put into
operation on 1 April 1975, as warheads were fitted to the
interceptors, but there had already been rumblings about the
system's high cost and relative ineffectiveness. Not long
after the Grand Forks site became operational, Congress voted
to terminate it, and the site was deactivated in 1976. 145
There was little opposition to the dissolution of the U.S.
ABM system, limited as it had been. Kissinger notes that "we
wound up with a curious coalition of the Pentagon and the arms
controllers, both finally opposed to [ABM] : the Pentagon
because it no longer made any military sense to put resources
into a programme that was being systematically deprived of
military utility and the arms control community because they
saw in the strategic vulnerability of the U.S. a positive
asset." 146
H. THE LATE 1970S
In 1974, Secretary of Defense Schlesinger completed a
study of issues designed to resolve U.S. anxiety about the
144 Davis, p. 25.
145 Broad, "Star Wars Traced to Eisenhower Era," p. C3.
146 Kissinger, p. 265.
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strategic balance. This study, intended to encompass changes
in targeting, the size of strategic nuclear forces, and hedges
against Soviet achievement of exploitable superiority,
resulted in adoption of several specific, evolutionary
modifications that reflected Nixon's desire to ensure credible
warfighting capabilities. The modifications, described in
National Security Decision Memorandum 242, included
counterforce targeting and were essentially a break with the
assured destruction doctrines of the McNamara era. Although
the "Schlesinger Shift" moved the U.S. closer to a policy of
"Flexible Response," the U.S. did not actually possess the
forces necessary to implement the changes. Perhaps as
importantly, emphasis on strategic defense was absent from
Schlesinger ' s proposal. Reduction of antiaircraft defenses
continued as only the Nike-Hercules batteries in Alaska and
Florida were retained; the fighter-interceptor force was also
trimmed. 147
The ABM Treaty permitted research and development
activities, however, and these continued in spite of concerns
that it was a waste of resources to pursue programs the U.S.
had agreed not to deploy. The Site Defense program was
intended to provide options for more effective defense bf
Minuteman silos than the currently deployed Safeguard system.
147 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of the Secretary
of Defense James R. Schlesinger to the Congress on the FY 1975
Defense Budget and FY 1975-1979 Defense Program (Washington,
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Little more than another modification of Nike-X, Site Defense
would have used Sprint II missiles for interception. None of
these missiles were actually built, but the system was tested
without them in the late 1970s. 148 In spite of these
"deficiencies," Site Defense and the programs that followed
it fulfilled an important function. They enabled the U.S. to
maintain an essential ABM technology development program, to
hedge against technological surprise, to determine the
technical feasibility of new ABM concepts, and to assist in
the design and evaluation of offensive strategic ballistic
missile systems. 149
Site Defense was eventually replaced with the Low Altitude
Defense ( LoAD ) /Sentry program, which was conceived as a
limited number of mobile, self-contained units, each just
large enough to hold an individual radar and an interceptor
missile. 150 Essentially a "down-sized derivative" of its
predecessor, LoAD/Sentry followed the trend of scaling down
the size of components that began with the transition from
Safeguard to Site Defense; these smaller defensive units could
148 Bruce-Biggs, p. 354.
149 U.S. Department of Defense, Statement of Secretary of
Defense Elliot L. Richardson Before the House Armed Services
Committee on the FY 1974 Defense Budget and FY 1974-1978
Program, Tuesday, April 10, 1973 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 39 March 1973), p. 64.
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be concealed in ICBM shelters. 151 The LoAD/Sentry program was
active until 1984. 152
Running parallel to the Systems Technology programs
outlined above was another devoted to advanced technology.
This research program was a broad, long-term effort which
concentrated on five major areas of technology:
discrimination, data processing, optics, radar, and
interceptors. 153 Eventually, the Strategic Defense Initiative
Organization took over management of these programs.
As the 1970s drew to a close, antiaircraft defenses in
the U.S. were nearly nonexistent. Although older F-101 Voodoo
aircraft were being replaced by newer F-4 Phantoms and F-106
Delta Darts, and the F-102 Delta Dagger had been completely
eliminated from the inventory, the overall inventory of
fighter-interceptor aircraft had suffered a net loss of 348
units during the decade. 154 The Nike-Hercules and Hawk
batteries had been phased out in 1979, 155 so the U.S. was left
with a total of 273 aircraft to defend itself against the
151 Davis, pp. 49-50.
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possibility of a Soviet bomber attack. The F-106s themselves
were aging; plans had been considered as early as 1976 to
replace them early in the 1980s with a follow-on interceptor-
-probably a version of the F-14, F-15, or F-16. 156 The Carter
Administration never acted on these plans, however; instead,
the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps were tasked with
providing "additional interceptors in a crisis." 157
In the late 1970s, renewed interest in strategic defenses
grew out of the concern of U.S. strategists and public
officials with the total absence of U.S. defenses against
nuclear attack. 158 This interest was the result of two
increasingly important factors. First, there was a growing
fear in the military that land-based U.S. strategic missiles
were becoming vulnerable to a surprise Soviet attack, and a
belief that an ABM system might be able to protect at least
some of these forces. Second, while ABM critics maintained
that technology still had not solved the problems that existed
1 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of
Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld to the Congress on the FY 1977
Budget and Its Implications for the FY 1978 Authorization
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twenty years previously, the scientists involved in research
and development kept reporting steady progress in advanced
technologies such as lasers and particle beams. 159
I. CARTER AND REAGAN
Carter's Presidential Directive 59 of 29 July 1980 had
emphasized deterrence based on warfighting and the flexible
response strategy, but "homeland defense played almost no part
in deterrent plans." 160 Congressional interest in strategic
defense was emerging, however, and the Republican Party's
national platform endorsed the concept. 161
As a Soviet observer reported, "The Reagan Administration
displayed a fundamentally different attitude to BMD." 162
Indeed, with Reagan's inauguration, "the fortunes of BMD
soared. Initially, the mainstream BMD development program at
the time--the LoAD/Sentry system—received greatly increased
funding and priority." 163 Although every president, beginning
with Eisenhower, "had considered the possibility of
substituting defence [for Massive Retaliation and its clones]
159
160
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and rejected it," 164 Reagan not only raised the level of
officially expressed interest in strategic defenses, he also
set policy before technology. 165
The Department of Defense contends that it was not until
the early 1980s that "technological progress allowed us to
accord again a high priority to strategic defenses, " 166 but
poor financial support, rigorous requirements and the lack of
official endorsement undoubtedly impeded efforts to improve
extant technology. As one expert has noted, "Effective U.S.
ABM and air defenses are now achievable and have been for 20
years if the goal is not a perfect defense of all cities and
all targets." 167 The Reagan Administration attempted to focus
a broad and expanding range of strategic concern and
thought, 168 although Carter's Secretary of Defense, Harold
Brown, must be given credit for laying the groundwork for
programs that were implemented by his successor.
Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger's first annual
report to the U.S. Congress was quite optimistic: "We have
164 Brown, p. 55.
165 Payne and Gray, p. 821.
166 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
Congress FY89 (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing
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virtually ignored our strategic defensive systems for more
than a decade," he said. "Our program ends these years of
neglect." 169 To be sure, some of the modernization programs
advocated by the Administration were implemented: as early
as 1982, replacement of obsolete fighter-interceptors with F-
15s began, radars were upgraded or replaced, and the Strategic
Defense Initiative Organization was created. The SDI was
hailed as a signal not of "the abandonment of deterrence, but
[of] a desire to fortify it in a way that would actually
reduce the risks of war." 170 It remains to be seen whether a
research program will be accorded the status of prime
deterrent as assured destruction policies were.
The concrete manifestations of Reagan's attempt to move
U.S. strategic policy away from its absolute reliance on
offensive forces for deterrence lacked the comprehensiveness
necessary to effect a shift in doctrine. In spite of
estimates that defenses through the mid-1990s are "cost-
effective by a ratio of about 5:1, " 171 SDI remains a research
program; other than improvements in warning systems and the
169 U.S. Department of Defense, Report of Secretary of
Defense Caspar W. Weinberger to the Congress on the FY 1983
Budget, FY 1984 Authorization Request and FY 1983-1987 Defense
Programs (Washington, DC: U.S. Government Printing Office,
8 February 1982), p. 111-63.
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modernization of an air defense force restricted to peacetime
surveillance, there have been essentially no changes in the
U.S. force structure. No decision has been made to deploy
even the single ABM site permitted by the ABM Treaty.
Although Reagan "raised the level of rhetoric" about
ballistic missile defense and increased associated spending,
his Administration "carefully avoided committing itself to
preparations for destroying even one attacking missile." 172
The SDIO has spent the last five years searching for means to
meet a "responsive threat, " and thus relegated itself to
"research without logical end." 173 As a conservative observer
has somewhat cynically commented, the Department of Defense
"spends $300 billion annually, none of it on defense." 174
The SDI has managed, however, to fuel the strategic
debate. Perhaps the most important change in military policy
during the Reagan years was the "shift in emphasis between
offensive and defensive strategies." 175 Where defensive
strategies had received little or no attention since the ABM
Treaty was signed, they now competed with offensive strategies
for validity.
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"Critics condemn the SDI program, " the Department of
Defense contends, "as jettisoning certain deterrence in favor
of ineffective defense." 176 These critics fail to comprehend
the innate compatibility of the two concepts. Deterrence
essentially discourages the enemy from taking military action;
defense reduces costs and risks in the event deterrence fails.
While deterrence works on an enemy's intentions, defenses
reduce the enemy's capability to damage. 177 Defense comprises
merely one form of deterrence, namely deterrence through
denial
.
The official position of the White House is that SDI
"offers an opportunity to shift deterrence to a safer and more
stable basis through greater reliance on strategic defenses.
Such defenses, which threaten no one, would enhance deterrence
by injecting greater uncertainties into Soviet estimates of
their ability to achieve their military objectives should they
attempt a first strike. Even less than perfect defense could
increase stability by denying the Soviets confidence that they
could achieve meaningful military goals, thereby eliminating
incentives for a Soviet first strike." 178 The Soviets, in view
of the defensive measures they themselves have taken,
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undoubtedly recognize that it is unnecessary to choose between
deterrence and defense, since they can - and do - coexist and
complement each other.
Some observers believe that although the SDI might enable
an eventual shift from offensive to defensive strategies, such
a transition would have to wait until political differences
between the U.S. and the Soviet Union were alleviated. Even
so, SDI might "buy time" for the resolution of existing or
future disputes. 179 If the Soviets were not assured of a "free
ride" for their offensive ballistic missiles, they might be
more willing to settle controversies at the conference table
rather than on the battlefield.
General Secretary of the Soviet Union Gorbachev has
condemned SDI in no uncertain terms. "SDI is very dangerous,"
he says. "This project will, no doubt, whip up the arms race
in all areas, which means that the threat of war will
increase." A quick review of post-World War II history would
reveal that in most instances, when such action-reaction
phenomena occurred, it was usually the U.S. that was reacting
to Soviet maneuvers. One need only examine the early years
of the U.S. space program to confirm this. U.S. strategist
Colin S. Gray also disagrees that deployment of SDI would in
itself be the cause of an arms race. "This objection is
really no more than a truism," he has written. "Any U.S.
179 Gray, "Strategic Defenses," p. 52.
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strategic force development which threatens to thwart some
aspect of Soviet strategy, to deny some measure of military
advantage, may serve as fuel for Soviet competitive
behavior." 180 As Harold Brown so aptly put it, "When we build,
they build; when we don't build, they build." 181
Arms control and SDI should not be perceived as
incompatible or in competition. The two can be mutually
reinforcing goals, since both are intended to enhance security
and stability. There is a kind of synergism between the two
efforts. "Fewer strategic offensive weapons simplifies the
task of defending against them, while the prospect of
effective strategic defenses discourages Soviet reliance on
their preemptive offensive nuclear strategy." 182
The Soviet Union's most frequent objection to SDI is that
it undermines the ABM Treaty, which the Soviets, in spite of
their own extensive defensive efforts, insist must be strictly
complied with. "Under currently prevailing conditions, " one
U.S. expert notes, "the Soviets consider it imperative to keep
U.S. BMD efforts under control by perpetuating the ABM Treaty
regime, even though this imposes constraints on Soviet BMD
activities as well." 183 Soviet strategists, perhaps in a fit
180 Gray, "Strategic Defenses," p. 52.
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of mirror-imaging, further argue that the "cardinal aim" of
SDI "is to enable the USA to execute a first strike. The
purpose of the U.S. BMD system would be to rule out the Soviet
Union's retaliatory strike." 184 As has been previously
explained, the offensive or defensive nature of a weapon is
not inherent in that weapon, but exists in the end use for
which that weapon is intended.
J. CIVIL DEFENSE
According to the Soviets, any attempt in the capitalist
world to establish a civil defense system is "doomed to
failure, " because the private ownership of property precludes
the use of land, buildings, transportation and other
facilities necessary for a civil defense program. 185 This
Soviet opinion may in fact reflect accurately the prospects
for deployment in the U.S. of a civil defense program. For
the past forty years, efforts to create passive defenses of
population, economic assets and even government facilities
have met with little success. As the Committee on the Present
Danger has stated, "There is no U.S. counterpart [to Soviet
civil defense programs] , and perhaps there cannot be, given
the unattractiveness of civil defense to an open society." 186
184 Surikov, p. 36.
185 Harriet Fast Scott and William F. Scott, The Soviet
Control Structure: Capabilities for Wartime Survival (New





The perceived threat of air attack led to formation in
the 1920s and 1930s of a U.S. civil defense apparatus which
took its cue from similar "air raid precautions" in Britain
at the time. President Roosevelt put Fiorella LaGuardia -
assisted by Mrs. Roosevelt - in charge of civil defense during
World War 11, but as soon as the war ended, the civil defense
effort ended, too, along with rationing, victory gardens, and
other reminders of the war. 187
The Federal Civil Defense Agency was organized in 1949 by
President Truman in response to the Soviet Union's detonation
of its first atomic bomb. 188 State and local agencies
proliferated at first, and the FCDA's motto became "Survive,
Recover, and Win." 189
During the 1950s, the government's civil defense efforts
had the full cooperation of the press and other groups, and
therefore these programs received a great deal of attention.
The Advertising Council provided free coverage; newspapers and
magazines printed thousands of articles about civil defense.
Operation Alert exercises were conducted to help the
187 Bruce-Biggs, pp. 29-30 and 49.
188 Spencer R. Weart, "History of American Attitudes to
Civil Defense, " p. 12; and John Dowling, "FEMA: Programs,
Problems, and Accomplishments," p. 35; both in John Dowling
and Evans M. Harrell, eds., Civil Defense: A Choice of
Disasters (New York: American Institute of Physics, 1987).
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population practice its role in a nuclear war. The FCDA
taught citizens what to do "when the bombers came." 190
Military support was not as strong. Although the Army
identified millions of cubic yards of usable shelter space,
mainly for military installations and defense industries,
nothing was done with that information. The CONELRAD (Control
of Electronic Radiation) system was initiated in cooperation
with commercial radio stations during this period, although
the messages it delivers have since been purged of references
to enemy attack. There were educational films, discussions
of evacuation schemes and some attempts to spur interest in
a shelter program, but the basics of civil defense were
defined as "dig, die, or get out." 191
By 1957, calculations suggested that about 80% of all
deaths in a nuclear war would be caused by fallout, and
studies recommended an elaborate nationwide shelter program
as part of an overall defense program. FCDA urged the
government to invest in these shelters, and further to provide
mortgage insurance and tax breaks for citizens who built their
own. 192 One of the objectives of the National Defense Highway
Act of 1957 was to help defend the country: interstate
highways were designed to loop around cities, assuming nuclear
1 90 Weart, in Dowling and Harrell, pp. 13-14.
191 Bruce-Biggs, pp. 69-71.
192 Kaplan, p. 126.
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explosions would gut city centers; expressways were laid out
to facilitate evacuation. 194
The Gaither Committee, commissioned by Eisenhower to
evaluate civil defense, also recommended a massive program in
a report it presented to the President in November, 1957. The
committee, however, had decided that civil defense should take
"a back seat to what they saw as the much more pressing need
of building up a much larger offensive missile force and
protecting it from attack." 195
When the Kennedy Administration took office, the new
president felt he had to approve some kind of civil defense
program, mainly because the Berlin crisis was beginning to
heat up. In May, Kennedy announced that he was increasing
federal efforts for a nationwide fallout shelter program, and
in the 15 September issue of Life magazine, he addressed a
letter to the magazine's readers. The issue featured a large
section on fallout shelters, including directions on how to
build them and blueprints. 196
By December, however, the initial enthusiasm had begun to
cool. Not only had the urgency of the Berlin crisis passed,
but there were so many critics of the civil defense effort
194 Bruce-Biggs, p. 95.
195 Kaplan, pp. 134-135.
196 Kaplan, pp. 309-310.
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197
that it was turning into a politically unadvisable cause.
McNamara maintained that it was "the responsibility of each
individual to prepare himself and his family" for a nuclear
strike, and civil defense seemed to be taking on
characteristics that indicated it was meant only for the upper
classes. 198 This was the kiss of death as far as the
Democratic administration was concerned. It was increasingly
difficult to get people seriously interested in the effort,
and Congress routinely decimated budget requests for civil
defense. 199 Other than controversy, just about the only thing
to come out of the civil defense programs of the late 1950s
and early 1960s was construction of three underground command
facilities; these were for the Strategic Air Command, the
North American Air Defense command, and the Alternate National
Military Command Center. 200
By 1964, McNamara had aligned his civil defense rhetoric
with that of other strategic defensive concepts, maintaining
that civil defense, just like air defense, was useless without
leakproof ABM defenses. 201
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The next Administration to devote attention to civil
defense was Carter's, but this was largely a paper exercise.
In 1980, Presidential Directive 41 advocated "crisis
relocation, " or the evacuation of urban populations to "host"
areas. 202 Similarly, Presidential Directive 58 included
supported evacuation of military and civilian leaders and the
construction of new, hardened shelters for key personnel. 203
During the Carter Administration, and after several
organizational changes, FCDA became part of the Federal
Emergency Management Agency, which combined civil defense with
natural disaster relief and preparedness functions under a
single umbrella. 204 FEMA's mission is to provide "guidance
and technical and financial assistance to state and local
governments in the development of their preparedness plans,
"
205
but only about 10% of FEMA's budget is devoted to civil
defense, 206 and that budget is only about one-tenth of one
percent of total U.S. defense expenditures. 207 In contrast to
202 Bruce-Biggs, p. 397.
203 Jeffrey Richelson, "PD-59, NDSS-3, and the Reagan
Strategic Modernization Program, " The Journal of Strategic
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the Soviet Union, which devotes about $6 billion annually to
civil defense, 208 the U.S. spends about a dollar per person per
year on civil defense. Comparison of U.S. spending on civil
defense to that of other Western nations produces analogous
results: The Swiss and Norwegians spend about $10 per person
annually; West Germany and Finland, about $4. 209
FEMA has completed surveys of over one and a half million
buildings and identified 394.2 million prospective shelter
spaces. 210 These shelters would provide fallout but not blast
protection, and are mostly in the basements of public
buildings, mines, subways, and so on. 211 They include
unfiltered ventilation systems, which for the most part run
on electricity from municipal power sources - something which
is likely to be unavailable when the shelters are needed. 212
FEMA is also responsible for the Emergency Broadcast
System, a job which it shares with the 47th Communications
Group at NORAD. The 47th Communications Group is responsible
208 Brian D. Dailey, "Deception, Perceptions Management
and Self-Deception in Arms Control: An Examination of the ABM
Treaty," in Brian D. Dailey and Patrick J. Parker, Soviet
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210 FEMA, p. 9.
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for activating the system if, for some reason, FEMA cannot. 213
If the NORAD Commander decides the U.S. is being attacked, he
informs a civil defense representative at command headquarters
in Cheyenne Mountain, Colorado. The representative transmits
the warning through both the EBS and the National Warning
System. 214
If the system were to be activated, the U.S. populace
would have some warning of impending attack, although the
utility of this warning in the absence of adequate shelters,
evacuation plans, sources of food, water, air, communications,
and so on, is questionable. "Protection for the American
people and production base is presently contingent upon
successful counterforce second strikes, escalation control,
and a quick cease-fire," notes one American expert. 215
Some observers believe that "the inability of the U.S. to
protect its citizens, leadership and industrial
resources. . .undermines the credibility of the U.S. nuclear
deterrent," 216 but this situation is unlikely to change. The
213 Allan W. Ackerson, "Job Control Ensures Equipment,
Maintenance Always Ready for Mission, " The Space Observer , 7
July 1988, p. 8.
214 James C. Breese and D.L. Narver, Jr., "Improved
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and the Bomb (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,
1969), p. 60.
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cost of civil defense efforts is viewed as prohibitive, and
there is an underlying "conviction that such installations
217
would soon become pointless in a large-scale nuclear war."
Many experts contend that there will never be a substantial
civil defense effort in the U.S. "There is every reason to
believe, " they state, "that a strong initiative in civil
defense would have the same results today as [previously]
:
political divisions, heightened anxiety, some scattered
pockets of useful activity, and a final reaction of apathy and
despair." 218
K . SUMMARY
Advocates of strategic defenses point out that the U.S.
nuclear stockpile has diminished in both numbers and
megatonnage while the Soviet Union has massively increased
both; arms control has failed to prevent the deterioration of
the U.S. position relative to its major adversary. The U.S.
may neither wish nor be able to restore the military balance
by addition of offensive means alone. 219 The Department of
Defense acknowledges that "Our future ability to maintain an
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acceptable strategic balance depends on our developing both
U.S. strategic offensive and defensive capabilities." 220
As a consequence of the lack of homeland defenses, U.S.
willingness to carry out its retaliatory threat loses
credibility, as does its promise of a nuclear umbrella to
shield its allies. 221 Defense expert John M. Collins has
written that "U.S. promises to provide a nuclear umbrella for
allies lost credibility [without homeland defenses] , because
we could not unleash assured destruction strikes against the
Soviet Union to defend NATO or Asian friends without risking
national suicide." 222
The Reagan White House has also promoted strategic defense
as the solution to arms control: "By reducing the military
value of ballistic missiles, strategic defenses would
facilitate Soviet acceptance of significant arms reduction
agreements." 223 And, of course, if ABMs were again deployed,
antiaircraft and civil defenses might again acquire the
utility they lost when ABMs were dismantled.
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Morality has also entered into the debate: current
American policies are described as contravening American
principles, since threatening to kill the civilian population
of an opponent is genocide; these policies also defy common
sense, because deliberately leaving one's own population
undefended when means to defend (even if imperfectly) do exist
is suicidal. 224 "What is disturbing about the present
situation, " one writer states, "is not so much that the
country is undefended as that it is undefended because we are
afraid to defend ourselves." 225
Perhaps the most appealing arguments for strategic defense
are those which have been couched in the least provocative
language. These fall into four basic categories, some of
which have been alluded to above. First is the contention
that the U.S. "should have means of damage limitation other
than relying on Soviet restraint in the face of U.S.
retaliatory threats,
"
226 which is suggested in the Department
of Defense's Annual Report as it defines Direct Defense as
"deterrence through denial." 227
224 Foster, p. 137.
225 Bethell, p. 11.
226 Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western
Alliance
, p. 280.




Second is the case that supports strategic defenses as a
means to maintain the credibility of U.S. strategy. 228 This
argument contends that credibility rests not only on the
survivability of U.S. retaliatory forces, but also on the
willingness of the U.S. to risk the lives of millions of
Americans.
A corollary to this argument is that which stresses the
importance of strategic defenses if deterrence should fail.
Depending on the extent to which they are deployed, defenses
can protect population, economic resources, property, and
retaliatory forces from attacking missiles and aircraft.
The fourth argument assumes that strategic defenses could
cause uncertainties for Soviet attack planners. 229 This
uncertainty could further deter an attack. Even if an attack
is launched, Soviet planners will not know which, if any, of
their offensive forces will actually impact their targets.
At a minimum, planners would be forced to use many more
offensive weapons to attack a defended target than one which
is completely vulnerable.
"At the very least," a U.S. strategist contends, "it would
be grossly irresponsible and imprudent to refuse the challenge
to try to live in greater safety with nuclear weapons that
228 Robert McFarlane, p. 47.
Yost, Sov.
Alliance, p. 303.




230 A recent report issued by the
President's Commission on Integrated Long-Term Strategy
emphasizes the need for both active and passive defenses
against Soviet missiles to deter Soviet attacks on theater and
intercontinental targets. 231 The Reagan Administration
has proposed to the Soviet Union a cooperative shift from
reliance on offensive means alone to deter. "Consistent with
our belief that strategic defenses may offer a safer, more
stable basis for deterrence," Reagan has said, "we seek Soviet
agreement for an orderly transition to a more defense-reliant
world." 232 Whether this transition occurs remains to be seen.
Considering the total lack of commitment to strategic defenses
beyond the research and development stage in the U.S., things
do not look promising.
230 Gray, "Strategic Defenses," p. 51.
231 Discriminate Deterrence (Report of the Commission on
Integrated Long-Term Strategy), January, 1988, p. 51.
232 National Security Strategy of the United States, p.
17.
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IV. STRATEGIC DEFENSE AND THE SOVIET UNION
A. BACKGROUND
The Soviet Union's attitude toward strategic defenses
differs greatly from that of the United States. History and
geography have an impact on this attitude, as do ideology and
the resulting national style. However, the availability of
nuclear weapons has probably had the greatest effect on the
Soviet Union's perceptions of the need to defend itself,
although recent Soviet pronouncements seem to indicate that
such a task is hopeless.
"[I]t is imperative to realize that the nature of nuclear
arms leaves no hope that any of the states will be able to
protect itself solely by means of military technology, through
creating the most powerful defence, " a Soviet expert on
weapons of mass destruction has said. 233 The notion expressed
by this expert, that pursuit of worthwhile defenses is a
futile effort, is based on certain presumptions about the
nature of nuclear war, which the Soviets would have the rest
of the world believe is not survivable. As General Secretary
Mikhail Gorbachev says, "Everyone seems to agree that there
233 Surikov, p. 11.
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would be neither winners nor losers in such a war. There
would be no survivors. It is a mortal threat for all." 234
"[N]ow, if a war breaks out, every living thing will be
wiped off the face of the earth, " the General Secretary
continues, encouraging his audience to believe that "nuclear
war is unwinnable. " 235 Nuclear war "would render us all
helpless and defenseless, " the Soviet expert says in
confirmation of Gorbachev's statement. "Nothing that is living
will survive." 236
These dire warnings would seem to contraindicate strategic
defenses, and support the contention that "Security can no
longer be assured by military means - neither by the use of
arms or deterrence, nor by continued perfection of the v sword'
and the 'shield.' The only way to security," according to
Gorbachev, "is through political decisions and disarmament." 237
If this is so, why, is the Soviet Union "doing all that
the United States is doing [in strategic defense research]?
...I guess we are engaged in research, basic research, which
relates to these aspects which are covered in the SDI of the
United States," as Gorbachev admitted in November, 1987? As
the U.S. Department of Defense contends, "the Soviet effort
234 Mikhail S. Gorbachev, Perestroika (New York: Harper
& Row, 1987), p. 11.
235 Gorbachev, p. 138.
236 Surikov, pp. 9, 10.
237 Gorbachev, p. 141.
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into all aspects of strategic defense has been consistently
more vigorous than that of the United States." 238 This effort
has resulted in a highly developed strategic defensive
infrastructure that includes anti-ballistic missiles, surface-
to-air missiles, air defense interceptors, antisatellite
capabilities, ABM and air defense radars and a pervasive civil
defense program along with appropriate weaponry and support
systems for each of these components. 239
This paper suggests that, in spite of rhetoric which may
be intended mainly for Western public consumption, the Soviets
believe they "can wage nuclear war and win it, and behave
accordingly. The lesson of the Great Patriotic War, as
[Soviet leaders] seem to have learned it, is that Soviet
resiliency and resolve will again prevail." 240 How does the
West, in particular the United States and its allies, resolve
the dissonance between what the Soviet Union is saying, and
what its real intentions are? Although definite answers to
all questions about the Soviet Union can not be given, Soviet
history, trends, capabilities, force structures, and writings-
military writings in particular—can provide some indication
of the "sincerity" of such pronouncements as those quoted
above
.
238 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 55.
239 Van Cleave, p. 19.
240 Scott and Scott, p. ix.
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B. DECEPTION
"Soviet strategy, like Soviet thinking, has always been
devious where American has been direct, " comments one
observer. 241 Many authors have addressed Soviet deceptive
practices, 242 and it has been suggested that the Soviet Union
functions under an ethical system which differs greatly from
the Judeo-Christian ethics adopted by most Western nations.
This ethical system, based on the declaration of good (rather
than the prohibition of evil, best exemplified by the "thou
shalt nots" of the Ten Commandments), hinges on the assumption
that the ends justify the means. If, therefore, deception
advances the Marxist-Leninist cause, as advocated by the
Communist Party, it is not only acceptable, but intrinsically
desirable behavior. "[T]he predisposition to such practices
and the defense of them constitutes a commitment by the
Soviets, albeit culturological or strategic, to the widespread
241 T.R. Fehrenbach, This Kind of War, Korea; A Study in
Unpreparedness (New York: Macmillan, 1963), p. 64.
242 See, for example, Dailey and Parker, cited above; and
Diane Chotikul, The Soviet Theory of Reflexive Control in
Historical and Psychocultural Perspective: A Preliminary
Study (Monterey, CA: Naval Postgraduate School, 1986).
243 See, for instance, Vladimir Lefebvre, Algebra of
Conscience (Boston: D. Reidel, 1982).
76
and systematic use of deceit as policy, which makes appraisal
of threat difficult " 244
Awareness of the basic ethical differences in the
fundamental precepts under which the two superpowers operate
has two desirable consequences for Western observers. First,
it should encourage resistance to mirror-imaging, a Western
tendency which the Soviets promote. "The main condition for
success in this propagandistic influence is masking the very
fact of influence," Vladimir Lefebvre has pointed out. "For
example, this could be done by suggesting the symmetry of
Soviet and American societies ( "You have red tape and we have
red tape;" "Way down deep we are all alike;" "You want peace
and we want peace"). As a result, according to propagandists'
plans, the Western audience would not doubt the sincerity of
the Soviet representatives or other sources of information." 245
Second, it should prompt an appreciation of the fact that
Soviet deceptive practices do, indeed, exist, and are a valued
method of operation for the Soviet Union.
It has been pointed out that "in no other state do
political words stand in such contrast to reality as in
244 Roger A. Beaumont, Maskirovka: Soviet Camouflage,
Concealment and Deception , Stratech Studies SS 82-1, Center
for Strategic Technology, Texas A & M University, College
Station, TX, November, 1982, p. 36, as cited in Chotikul, p.
65.
245 Vladimir Lefebvre, Reflexive Control: The Soviet
Concept of Influence on Adversary's Decision Making Process
(Englewood, CO: Science Applications, Inc., SAI-84-024-FSRC-
E, February, 1984), p. 4, as cited in Chotikul, p. 10.
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Russia, [although] .. .it is common practice to dilute vranyo
with injections of truth." 246 ("Vranyo" refers to untruths
which have some grounding in reality, as opposed to "lozh,"
which are actual lies and total untruths. 247 ) As one Western
expert has noted, "Some observers have asserted that the
Soviets no longer seek their traditional goal of world
conquest through revolution. Since the early 1970s and the
advent of detente, such views have been expressed quite
forcefully (and hopefully) in the West.... But world history
since 1918 demonstrates that Soviet foreign policy cannot be
accepted at face value." 248
Certainly, the West should listen to what the Soviets are
saying, but it is at least as important that the West
carefully examine Soviet actions as well. 249 To this end, one
must look at Soviet theories of deterrence and damage
limitation, and the nature of psychological and material
preparations the Soviet Union has made in order to ready
itself for the possibility of war.
246 Ronald Hingley, The Russian Mind (New York: Charles
Scribner's Sons, 1977), p. 97.
247 Chotikul, p. 66.
248 Kurt London, ed., The Soviet Union in World Politics
(Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1980), p. ix.
49 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:




Because "[h]istory has taught the Soviet Union to depend
mainly on itself in insuring its security and that of its
friends, " 250 ideas of mutual self-interest and mutual
vulnerability are both unacceptable premises to Soviet
concepts of deterrence. In direct contrast to Western
formulations of Mutual Assured Destruction, no concept "is
more alien to Soviet thought than viewing Soviet vulnerability
to enemy weapons as an advantageous situation to be
perpetuated indefinitely." 251
The Soviets firmly believe that both offensive forces and
defensive systems contribute to stability and deterrence, 252
in a dialectical relationship that will subsequently be
examined herein. While the West has largely dissociated
concepts of defense from methods of deterrence, Soviet
military thought encompasses no such distinction253 between
deterrence and, as an integral component of military
capabilities, the ability to defend oneself.
250 Nikolai Talensky, "Missile Defense: A Response to
Aggression," in Brzezinski, p. 218.




252 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 215.
253 Stanley Sienkiewicz, "Soviet Nuclear Doctrine and the
Prospects for Strategic Arms Control." In Derek Leebaert,
ed., Soviet Military Thinking (London: George Allen & Unwin
Ltd., 1981), p. 84.
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The Soviets view defense as a specific means for reducing
a nation's dependence on the "goodwill and designs" of
adversaries for security. 254 They are well aware that "even
partially effective defenses can provide a significant
deterrent to aggression." 255
None of this is to say that the Soviet Union ignores the
contribution of offensive capabilities and of the credibility
of their warfighting posture to the credibility of their
deterrent. "The fact that [a peaceable, non-aggressive state]
is in possession of a combination of anti-missile means and
effective nuclear rocket forces, " notes General Talensky,
"serves to promote the task of deterring a potential
aggressor, insuring its own security, and maintaining the
stability of world peace." 256 The Soviets may, of course,
credit defensive systems with greater capabilities than the
United States does, which would consequently induce the
Soviets to magnify the contribution of defenses to
deterrence. 257
It is important to recognize this damage-limitation-
through-defense aspect of Soviet concepts of deterrence, since
it differs extensively from Western theories. The Soviets
254 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 216.
255 U.S. Department of Defense, Annual Report to the
Congress FY 1989
, pp. 48-49.
256 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 215.
257 Hoffman, in Haley and Merritt, p. 30.
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recognize offense as a means of defense which results when
offensive weapons are used in a damage-limitation role to
destroy an opponents weapons before those weapons are used.
The Soviets see no political or military utility in strategies
which diminish prospects for survival in a nuclear war, and
look "beyond the offensive requirements needed to destroy the
opponent. . .to the defensive requirements that would permit the
Soviet Union to survive and win" such a war. 258
Although Khrushchev premised his view of the Soviet
deterrent posture on a secure capability to retaliate, 259 the
Soviets see purely counterforce strategies as the basis for
deterrence by defense as vitally flawed. "It is only the
aggressor that can resort to [counterforce strategies] before
the first rocket salvos are fired, before war actually breaks
out," according to General Talensky. "In order to destroy the
enemy's nuclear-rocket installations they must be hit before
they launch their rockets, which means that the peaceable
side, the aggressor's objective, will by fending off nuclear
attack be forced to deal the first strike." 260
D. SURPRISE ATTACK
While on the surface the concept of a surprise attack
appears inherently offensive, the use of a first strike as a
258 Deane, p. 3.
259 Sienkiewicz, in Leebaert, p. 75.
260 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 213.
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means of defense meshes practically with Soviet concepts of
damage limitation, because any measure that limits damage to
the Soviet Union is considered by the Soviets to be defensive
in nature.
First strikes, which may sometimes take the form of
surprise attacks, are generally agreed to be a very decisive
form of military action. Soviet military planners could
easily calculate the effects of a large-scale nuclear attack,
particularly against an unprepared, unwitting opponent. While
American planners concluded that the possibility of a surprise
attack meant that the reliable capability to strike second,
or retaliate, would constitute the American deterrent, Soviet
planners determined that a different course of action was in
the best interests of the Soviet Union. This course of
action, preemption, is, to Soviet planners, inherently a
defensive idea predicated upon a traditional military
solution. A preemptive capability, because of the inherent
threat of retaliation, had to be supported by the erection of
suitable defenses, no matter what the cost of these
defenses, 261 but preemption gave the Soviets a relative
advantage here, too, because their defenses needed to protect
only against a retaliatory strike rather than a first
strike. 262 When damage limitation as a strategy is taken into
261 Sienkiewicz, in Leebaert, pp. 83, 84.
262 Davis, p. 63.
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consideration, it is easier to understand Soviet development
and deployment of defensive systems which incorporate
technologies that the U.S. finds unacceptable because of their
limitations. Soviet defenses are not an end in themselves,
but components of a much larger, coordinated system. 263
The logic of utilizing an immanently offensive action as
a means of defense may appear to be somewhat convoluted, but
according to some Western experts on Soviet military thinking,
if the Soviets cannot yet confidently rule out the possibility
that "the West could successfully mount a surprise attack,
then one continues to pursue all plausible means to preclude
it." 264 This seems to render the distinction between offensive
and defensive actions dependent to a great extent upon one's
point of view.
In this vein, Samuel P. Huntington maintains that while
weapons, technology, and military capabilities can be usefully
differentiated in a variety of ways, the offense/defense
distinction resides far more in how these things are used than
in their inherent nature. He states that the distinction is
valid when applied to how military forces will be used, and
in relation to a state's overall foreign policy goals. When
a state initiates the use of military force, its strategy or
policy is considered to be offensive; if it uses military
263 Sayre Stevens, "Speculations on Soviet Responses to
SDI," Signal
,
December, 1986, p. 123.
264 Sienkiewicz, in Leebaert, p. 82.
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forces "primarily to prevent the enemy" from attacking,
destroying, seizing or holding its assets, its actions are
defensive. 265 When examined in this context, as a means
specifically to prevent the enemy from attacking, the
defensive nature of a preemptive attack becomes clearer.
What might seem a "use-it-or-lose-it" approach to conflict
to some - particularly in the West - is a rational means of
survival to the Soviet Union. Soviet ideology mandates a
national defense that can effectively shield the communist
system and ensure its preservation; ultimately, that defense
"depends on the destruction of the opposing system by
offensive means." 266 General Talensky felt "it is
theoretically and technically possible to counterbalance the
absolute weapons of attack with equally absolute weapons of
defense, thereby objectively eliminating war regardless of the
desires of resisting governments." In other words, nuclear
rockets could be fought with nuclear rockets. 267 As Huntington
proposed, defensiveness resides in the use, not the weapon
itself.
The Soviet Union's view of the defensive uses of offensive
means must be fully understood within the context of Soviet
265 Huntington, in Kruzel, pp. 36-7.
Michael J. Deane and liana Kass, "Why Strategic
Defense But Not Defensive Strategy?" Signal , November, 1987,
p. 104.
267 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 213.
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strategic doctrine. This "Soviet preference for an offensive
strategy. .. is complemented by a requirement for the greatest
possible limitation of damage to Soviet political, economic,
and military order." 268 By dominating an initial exchange of
nuclear weapons through preemption when war appears
inevitable, the Soviets could limit the amount of damage an
opponent might inflict and thus reduce the requirements for
defensive systems. 269 Although the Soviets assume a
retaliatory strike in response to their preemption of a first
strike, 270 the damage inflicted by this retaliation would be
lessened still further by various means of defense, both
passive and active, civil and military. 271 The ultimate
combination of offensive strikes and defensive preparations
sought by the Soviet Union is intended to restrict the damage
U.S. retaliation could cause to Soviet society, 272 and thereby
frustrate U.S. strategy.
268 Deane, pp. 19-20.
269 Sayre Stevens, "Ballistic Missile Defense in the
Soviet Union," Current History
, October, 1985, p. 345.
270 Deane, p. 19.
271 Sayre Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in Carter
and Schwartz, p. 187.
272 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
, p. 102.
85
E. THE OFFENSE/DEFENSE DIALECTIC
As is readily apparent from the preceding discussion, the
Soviets find it ideologically impossible to rely on a strategy
predicated solely on defensive measures. "Strategic defense
and then counterforce cannot under modern conditions ensure
the achievement of the war's decisive aims," according to
Marshal Sokolovsky. "This does not mean that defense as
a ... temporary type of... action will have no place in a future
war." 273
While defense cannot serve as the basic form of Soviet
military activity, it is an integral part of Soviet offensive
strategy. The Soviets "see a symbiotic relationship between
offense and defense, in which the dividing line [between the
two] has become almost impossible to determine." 274 The
ubiquitous dialectic that runs through Marxist ideology mates
the ideas of systemic defense and systemic offense as
"mutually reinforcing requirements." 275 This relationship
between the offense and defense manifests itself in several
ways.
First, as has already been discussed, offense can be
considered a method of defense when used as the agent of
273 Marshal of the Soviet Union V.D. Sokolovsky, ed.,
Voyennaya Strategiya , Third Edition (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1968), pp. 341-342, as cited in Deane, p. 20.
274 Deane, p. 21.
275 Deane and Kass, p. 104.
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preemptive strategies. Second, defense can contribute to
offense when it defends or protects offensive weapons. Third,
offensive and defensive weapons, when and to the extent they
can be distinguished from each other, "develop by permanent
dialectical interaction, so that improvements in one require
and/or lead to improvements in the other." 276
This third manifestation of the offense/defense
relationship is perhaps the most important to this paper.
General Talensky stressed the dialectic involved in weapons
development. "The long development of the means of warfare
has revealed one characteristic law: there is a kind of
struggle between the means of attack and the means of
defense, " he said. "Sooner or later, every new means of attack
leads to the emergence of a means of defense." 277 This
interaction, permanent and historically validated, includes
competition between the offense and defense for dominance.
The result of this competition, for the Soviets, is the
simultaneous pursuit of offensive and defensive improvements
in order to deny an opponent even a temporary strategic
advantage in one direction or the other. 278 While offensive
weapons are being developed in the Soviet Union, measures to
defend against similar threats from potential aggressors are
276 Deane, p. 21.
277 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 211.
278 Deane and Kass, p. 107
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concurrently being investigated. For example, as ballistic
missile submarines became ever quieter, methods of non-
acoustic detection of those submarines were explored. Perhaps
this could best be described as the synchronous, intentional
evolution of both measures and countermeasures
.
To sum up the relationship between offense and defense,
in the words of a Soviet military spokesman, "Offense and
defense constitute a dialectical unity of opposites, which
simultaneously both exclude and assume one another. They not
only are interconnected, but also mutually penetrate one
another and cannot exist separately. When an army attacks,
it at the same time and in some measure also defends." 279
F. SOVIET MILITARY GOALS
The ultimate Soviet goal in war is nothing short of
victory, which can be defined for the Soviets as the survival
of the communist system and the crushing, decisive defeat of
the opponent as a political entity. 280 Such a goal entails
not only destruction of the enemy's capability and will to
fight, but also maintenance of Communist Party control over
the Soviet state and its forces, preservation of a basis for
Colonel I. A. Grudinin, Doctor of Philosophical
Science, Dialektika i sovremennoye voyennoye delo (Moscow:
Voyenizdat, 1971), p. 57, as cited in Deane, p. 21.
280 Deane and Kass, p. 104.
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military and economic reconstitution, and domination of the
postwar era. 281
Forces to destroy the enemy would consist of offensive
components of the Soviet military capabilities, but survival,
maintenance of control, and preservation require forces
capable of protecting the Soviet Union. These forces for
preservation are comprised of strategic defensive and civil
defense forces, both of which are deemed essential to the
effort. 282 American strategic theories, which place emphasis
on the offensive to the virtual exclusion of the defensive,
are criticized as "one-sided" by the Soviets, who focus upon
the "balanced and harmonious development of all of their
military forces, " since victory is possible only through the
combined efforts of all forces. 283
"Offense is predicated on a defense of the homeland" or
rear, 284 and strategic defensive operations are designed to
defeat enemy air and missile attacks and to ensure stability
281 Stevens, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 186.
282 Mose L. Harvey, in the Foreword to Deane, p. iii.
283 M.M. Kir'yan, Problemy voyennoy teorii v sovetskikh
nauchno-spravochnykh izdaniyakh (Problems of Military Theory
in Soviet Scientific-Reference Books) (Moscow: "Nauka,
"
1985), p. 66, as cited in John G. Hines, Phillip A. Petersen
and Notra Trulock III, "Soviet Military Theory from 1945-2000:
Implications for NATO," The Washington Quarterly , Fall, 1986,
Vol. 9, No. 4, p. 118.
284 William E. Odom, "Soviet Military Doctrine, " Foreign
Affairs
, Vol. 67, No. 2, Winter 1988/89, p. 124.
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of the national war management system. 285 The Soviets have no
faith in existential deterrence; the credibility of their
deterrent is based on the ability of their armed forces to
actually carry out the warfighting (and winning) doctrine of
the Soviet Union.
Defense of the rear is one of a "unique Soviet triad of
capabilities" (which includes seizure of contiguous land
theaters and projection of war into the noncontiguous theaters
that may affect the campaigns in Europe). 287 In order to
defend the rear, the Soviets have acquired a spectrum of
defensive capabilities that dwarfs the efforts of all other.
G. COMMITMENT TO STRATEGIC DEFENSES
"It speaks volumes," says Robert Gates, Deputy Director
of the Central Intelligence Agency, "that in a relationship
in which for twenty or more years strategic stability
presumably has been based on mutual vulnerability, the Soviet
Union has been working to eliminate its own vulnerability and
consolidate a unilateral strategic advantage. .. [I] t is our
judgment that over the past ten years the Soviet Union has
285 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 17.
Harvey, in the Foreword to Deane, p. iii.
287 Odom, p. 124.
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spent nearly $150 billion on strategic defense, or almost
fifteen times what the U.S. has spent." 288
Although this statement speaks volumes about the lack of
a U.S. commitment to strategic defense, its point is to
emphasize the Soviet Union's continued dedication to defending
itself. While the United States greatly decreased its efforts
in strategic defense about twenty years ago, the Soviets
maintained their resolute endeavors to build and improve their
defenses. 289 The Soviets, in fact, spend as about as much on
strategic defense as they do on strategic offensive forces;
as a result, Soviet passive defenses of both civilian and
military targets and strategic air defenses dwarf those of the
United States, and the USSR maintains the world's only
operational antiballistic-missile capability. 290
As far as the Soviet Union is concerned, only U.S.
strategic defenses (and U.S. military capabilities generally)
are "destabilizing to the international balance and world
peace." 291 The continuous Soviet buildup of its nuclear forces
288 Robert M. Gates, "The Soviets and SDI," an address to
the World Affairs Council of Northern California (Bay Area
International Forum), 25 November 1986, manuscript, p. 3, as
cited in Richard B. Foster, "The Necessity for Strategic
Defenses," Comparative Strategy , Vol. 6, No. 2, 1987, p. 135.
289 Joseph Churba, Soviet Breakout (Washington, DC:
Pergamon-Brassey' s, 1988), p. 53.
290 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 102.
291 Deane, p. 108.
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is "all the more ominous" when viewed in conjunction with such
efforts as their increases in air defenses, modernization of
the Moscow ABM system with the deployment of what amounts to
a new system, steady expansion of the nationwide network of
over 1500 buried command bunkers, and military writings
reflecting a belief that the Soviets could prevail in a
nuclear war. 292 According to the fourth annual report on the
Soviet economy released recently by the Joint Economic
Committee of Congress, the Central Intelligence Agency and the
Defense Intelligence Agency, despite Gorbachev's pledges,
there is no evidence of a slackening in Soviet military
spending; 293 in fact, Soviet defense spending has risen, not
diminished, under Gorbachev. 294 But figures on defense
spending alone cannot fully convey the magnitude of the Soviet
strategic defensive program.
H. DEFENSIVE PREDISPOSITION
In the 1960s, U.S. theorists believed that Soviet
doctrine, influenced by what was perceived as the "logic of
war" in the nuclear age, would eventually parallel that of the
West, and that doctrines recognizing mutual self-interest
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would emerge. However, the premises of Soviet military
science and doctrine have resulted in fundamental
differences. 306 Specifically, while the U.S. has found
strategic defenses to be of questionable value, the Soviet
Union has, under basically the same circumstances, continually
and enthusiastically developed and maintained various large-
307
scale defensive measures.
The Soviets, convinced that mutual destruction strategies
were nothing more than a suicide pact, 308 strived to lessen
their vulnerability to nuclear weapons through homeland
defenses. Taught by both World Wars that "preparation of the
rear" is a priority goal, the Soviets believed that unless the
rear can be defended and its resources mobilized, chances for
success in a war were minimal. 309 By developing defenses, the
Soviets reasoned, they might be able to create a situation in
which mutual destruction is not the probable outcome. 310
While "the Soviets mark the necessity of creating a
'reliable defense, ' sufficient for 'ensuring the stability of
the operation of the whole national economy and reliably
defending the population throughout the entire territory of
306 Odom, p. 121.
307 Stevens, "Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet
Union, " p. 313.
308 Deane and Kass, p. 104.
309 Odom, p. 121.





a strategy based on defense alone to the
exclusion of offensive forces is unacceptable to the Soviet
Union. Relying upon defenses to ensure Soviet survivability
would imply that the Soviets are willing to "accept whatever
level of destruction the opponent can inflict, " and further,
that the Soviet Union has foregone its active role in changing
the correlation of forces. 312
Defenses serve additional, important political purposes
to the Soviet Union. Doctrines of mutual vulnerability which,
in effect, leave the fate of the state in the hands of its
opponents, are perceived to be contrary to the internal
political well-being of the Soviet state, 313 since the
leadership views its ability to assume a role as the nation's
protector as a major factor in assuring the loyalty of the
masses. 314 The Soviet Union also uses its defenses as "a basis
for enhancing international stature,
"
315 through projection of
the message that the Soviet leadership is "seriously committed
to its competitive struggle with the West, even if this
entails the possibility of military clash. Forfeiting defense
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would send the message that Soviet behavior is open to
manipulation and depends on the goodwill of the Soviet Union's
enemies," 316 as General Talensky stated in 1965. Such a
weakness would undoubtedly be exploited by the capitalist
states who, the Soviet Union believes, seek the demise of
communism.
Soviet leaders are preparing their military forces not
merely to deter, but also for the possibility of actually
fighting a war. Strategic defenses, which they feel would
enable them to protect the leadership as well as to neutralize
the ability of an opponent's nuclear forces to prevail, 317 are
a key, integrated component of their military strategy. 318
Rooted in the costs of inadequate preparation and the
consequent inability to prevent the destruction caused by
German air raids on Moscow and Leningrad during World War
II, 319 the Soviet Union's compulsion to defend itself was
further justified by the U.S. monopoly on nuclear weapons
during the initial postwar years. Even after the Soviets
developed their own nuclear arsenal, the lack of adequate
means of delivery mandated "creation of an extensive strategic
316 Deane and Kass, p. 104.
317 Churba, p. 53.
318 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
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defense, lest the inability to survive in war render its
offensive strategy politically useless and militarily
senseless." 320 Once the Soviets acquired an intercontinental
delivery capability, the role of strategic defenses was not
diminished, even though these defenses would now have to deal
with "merely" a retaliatory attack, and not a full-scale first
strike.
During the postwar era, the Soviets realized that, as
might be expected in the offense/defense dialectic, the
development of strategic defensive technology lagged behind
that of offensive technology. This fact did not diminish
Soviet pursuit of defensive capabilities, which were allowed
to flourish while the West was preoccupied with the Soviet
Union's offensive threat and consequently paying relatively
little attention to Soviet defense efforts. Although the
Soviets found that strategic defense did not evolve equally
in its three elements (civil, antiaircraft, and antimissile),
each type of defense had its merits and was therefore worthy
of investigation, development, and establishment. 321
Currently, strategic defenses play a role which appears
nearly to equal to that of offensive forces in Soviet
strategy. Strategic defenses enhance the credibility of
Soviet offensive forces insofar as they have the potential to
320 Deane and Kass, p. 106.
321 Deane and Kass, pp. 106-107.
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intercept and destroy U.S. retaliatory weapons before they
reach their targets; 322 likewise, even passive Soviet defenses
(such as hardening and mobility), by posing challenges to U.S.
target acquisition and damage-inflicting capabilities, can
reduce the credibility of the U.S. deterrent.
It is unlikely that the Soviet Union will give up its
quest for ever more effective defenses. Soviet dedication to
strategic defense appears to be open-ended; since absolute
systems for defense are "impossible in Soviet military-
scientific theory, the strategic defensive buildup must be
unending. The only limitation acknowledged is the temporary
obstacle of technical feasibility,
"
324 an obstacle which the
Soviets believe can eventually be overcome. If, in fact, the
Soviet Union is "nearing the point at which future expansion
of its strategic offensive nuclear arsenal would have little
or no payoff for its warfighting, damage-limiting strategy,
then the potential for. . .returns to improvements in strategic
defenses are enormous." 325 After all, there is probably a
finite limit to the number of targets that the Soviets would
322 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 46.
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find militarily consequential, and a concurrent limit to what
the Soviets can successfully target, given the current state
of antisubmarine warfare capabilities. In a situation where
political considerations, resources, utility, and technology
may proscribe further offensive efforts, attention might
reasonably be redirected to defenses, particularly when the
perception of a threat continues to exist. As one Soviet
military writer explains, "If potential opponents possess
weapons of mutual destruction, decisive advantage goes to that
side which first manages to create a defense [against those
weapons] . m326
I. THE INCEPTION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE IN THE SOVIET UNION
The Soviet Union has devoted an impressive amount of time
in its seventy years of existence to development of its
strategic defensive concept and infrastructure. As early as
the mid-1920s, a vocal minority of Soviet military
strategists, including Leon Trotsky, advocated a defensive
strategy. Trotsky, whose reasoning was grounded mainly in
economic considerations, proposed that the standing Red Army
be divided into numerous labor armies. These armies, centered
around factories and farms, would be dispersed throughout the
Soviet Union; since the means of transportation necessary to
326 Colonel V.M. Bondarenko, Sovremennaya nauka i
razvitiye voyennogo dela ( Voyenno - sotsiolologicheskiye
aspekty problemy ) (Moscow: Voyenizdat, 1976), p. 132, as
cited in Deane, p. 22.
98
mass these armies for an external attack was nonexistent at
the time, their purpose would be to provide internal defense.
Other contemporary Soviet strategists, arguing on military
grounds, proposed defensive strategies in response to the
lessons they felt had been learned in World War 1. They
believed that weapons technology had thwarted the offensive
strategy of annihilation and thereby proven the superiority
of defensive strategies of attrition.
Although these supporters of defensive strategies were
never able to consolidate a majority, the Soviets were forced
to depend on a strong defense while they lacked offensive
power during the interwar period. Soviet air defenses and the
Soviet civil defense program date from the mid-1920s; not even
the purges of the late 1930s decreased emphasis on the
development of these efforts. 327 Following World War II, the
Soviet leadership committed itself to ensuring that the
homeland could be protected from future ravages similar to
those it had suffered at the hands of the Nazi armies. Two
primary factors contributed to the strength of this
commitment. First, there were the "perceptions of Soviet
unpreparedness" that had arisen at the outset of the war, when
the German armies were able to push across the country to
Moscow itself. 328 Second, there was the military situation of
327 Deane and Kass, pp. 105-106.
328 Stevens, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 189.
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the era: the Soviets lacked not only nuclear weapons, but
also the necessary delivery vehicles, while long-range
329American bombers could directly threaten Soviet territory.
The Soviet Union has since steadfastly adhered to the dictates
of Lenin, who insisted that "the primary producer of all
mankind is the laboring man, the worker. If he survives, we
save everything. . .but if he dies, so does the State." 330
Particularly since the advent of the nuclear age, the
Soviets have placed great emphasis on the importance of
limiting the amount of damage the Soviet Union would suffer
in the event of another global war. 331 The Soviet General
Staff elevated defense of the rear to its first priority in
the late 1950s, 320 with the result that, even before the
Soviets had fielded intercontinental offensive forces, they
had deployed an "impressive and comprehensive strategic
defense, " composed of antimissile defense, antiaircraft
defense, and a nationwide civil defense program. 321
329 Hans Rhle, "Gorbachev's Star Wars," in Brzezinski,
p. 239.
V.I. Lenin, Complete Collected Works , 5th Edition,
Vol. 38 (Moscow: The Political Literature Publishing House,
1958), p. 359, cited in John M. Collins, The U.S. -Soviet
Military Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980
, p.
158.
331 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 46.
320 Odom, p. 123.
321 Deane and Kass, p. 106.
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Since World War II, the Soviets have sustained their air
defense efforts at a relatively high level, perhaps in part
because of the perceived threat of U.S. and other potentially
hostile air forces that ring the Soviet Union. 322 As a Soviet
defense ministry official contends, the Soviet Union is
"compelled to deploy a ramified nationwide air defense system
because the USA has surrounded the Soviet Union and other
countries of the socialist community with an extensive network
of military bases, at which it at all times maintains large
ground, air, and naval forces." 323 While the West dismissed
the utility of air defenses after SALT I limited ballistic
missile defenses, Soviet leaders "continue to give air defense
high praise. .. [they] seem to address the issue of air defense
as if the ABM Treaty did not exist." 324
Although the Soviets contend that their air defense system
"is intended to intercept only manned and unmanned
aircraft. .
.
[in defense of] vital administrative and industrial
centers and important military facilities,
"
325 the National
Air Defense Troops are also tasked with antimissile and
antispace missions: to destroy "all targets without
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exception." 326 Indeed, the Soviet Union's air defenses are




J. NATIONAL AIR DEFENSE TROOPS
The National Air Defense Forces of the Soviet Union are
the successor of Soviet local antiaircraft defense forces.
These forces were first organized on a nationwide basis in
1932, when they were placed under control of the NKVD, the
People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. 328 While about 75
per cent of the Soviet air defense effort during most of World
War II consisted of point defense of individual political and
economic centers, 329 since then these forces have greatly
expanded their coverage and assumed responsibility for the
development, acquisition, and operation of all Soviet
antiaircraft, antiballistic missile, and antisatellite weapons
systems. 330
Although strategic and tactical air defense functions were
officially separated in 1948, 331 the same year that the
326 Deane, p. 77.
327 Collins, p. 55.
328 Scott and Scott, p. 99.
329 Deane, p. 23.
330 Stevens, "Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet
Union," p. 314.




National Air Defense Forces were raised to the level of a main
branch of the Soviet armed forces, 332 the two elements recently
were again combined in a single infrastructure. Western
experts speculate that this aggregation greatly increases
Soviet air defense capabilities. The combination results in
a larger, more flexible, fully integrated force which shares
a common doctrine, training procedures, and research and
development costs under a single control structure to provide
multialtitude air defense coverage much more efficiently. 333
One of the eleven Deputy Ministers of Defense, 334 the
Commander-in-Chief of the National Air Defense Forces is
responsible for two major military districts: Moscow, the
seat of the Communist Party power structure, and Baku, where
much of the Soviet Union's petroleum production assets are
located. There are also fourteen smaller air defense regions,
eight within the Soviet Union and six in Warsaw Pact nations,
under control of the National Air Defense Forces Commander-
in-Chief. 335 The Air Defense Forces, which are also tasked
with providing warning to civil defense units, are further
332 Johan J. Hoist, "Missile Defense, the Soviet Union,
and the Arms Race, " in Hoist and Schneider, p. 147.
333 Collins, The U.S. -Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985
,
p. 55.
334 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 13.
335 Deane, p. 95; and Collins, The U.S. -Soviet Military
Balance: Concepts and Capabilities 1960-1980
, p. 73.
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divided into thousands of detachments, some of them very
small. 336
Overall, the Troops of National Air Defense rank third in
prominence within the Soviet military, behind the Strategic
Rocket Forces and the Ground Forces, 337 although in terms of
manpower, it is the second-largest service branch, 338 with
about half a million members339 - the same number which was
assigned to this service twenty years ago. 340 Unlike the other
service branches, however, the National Air Defense Troops
lack a distinctive service uniform: its pilots wear Air Force
uniforms, and its missile and radiotechnical troops the
uniforms of the Ground Forces.
A strong artillery tradition, due in part to the fact that
many early National Air Defense personnel came from artillery
forces, probably accounts for early air defense emphasis on
surface-to-air missiles (SAMs). 342 The Soviets conducted
highly successful tests of the first antiaircraft guided
336 Scott and Scott, p. 62.
337 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 46.
338 Deane, p. 97.
339 The Military Balance 1988-1989 (London: The
International Institute for Strategic Studies, 1988), p. 35.
340 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 148.
341 Deane, p. 97.
342 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 147.
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missile system, the SA-1 Guild, in the early 1950s, 343 and by
1956, Guild deployments around Moscow were visible. 344 This
system, the first widely deployed SAM system in the world, was
intended to counter very large bombing raids. 345 By 1958, a
second SAM, the SA-2 Guideline, destined to be widely deployed
throughout the Soviet Union, was introduced; this is the
missile which the Soviets used to shoot down a U.S. U-2 in
1960. The SA-2 was followed by the SA-3 Goa, first publicly
shown in 1964, which provided short-range defense against low-
altitude attacks. The Goa was produced in both fixed and
mobile versions. Subsequent systems, the SA-4 Ganeff, SA-5
Gammon, and SA-6 Gainful, included mobile missiles which were
launched from tracked vehicles. 346 Modernized versions of all
of these missiles, with the exception of the SA-4 and SA-6,
are still currently part of the Soviet air defense inventory,
along with the newer SA-10 Grumble and the SA-12. 347
Three currently operational SAMs, the SA-5, -10, and -12,
are dual capable: they can be used in both an antiaircraft
or anticruise-missile and antiballistic-missile mode. As
William R. Van Cleave has said, some of the new Soviet SAMs
343 Surikov, p. 32.
344 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 147.
345 Stevens, "Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet
Union," p. 314.
346 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 147-148.




"have such appreciable ballistic missile defense potential as
to blur the distinction between air defense and antibal list ic
missile defense." Van Cleave further maintains that the
Soviet air defense system has had this ballistic missile
defense potential for about twenty years. 346 It might be
useful here to point out, however, that the Soviets do not
seem to attach as much importance as the U.S. does to the
distinction between antiaircraft and antiballistic missile
systems. In Soviet writings, the same phrase, "zenitnykh
raketnykh komplekov, " is used to cover both capabilities. 349
Today the Soviets have 8,600 SAM launchers at 1,200
sites. 350 For instance, there are more than 30 SA-10 launch
sites around Moscow which are dedicated to defense of hardened
national war-management facilities and other high-value
military-industrial assets. These and other current SAM
systems will be discussed further in the chapter on net
assessment.
The "second tier" of Soviet air defense is its fighter-
interceptor force. The MiG-15 Fagot, introduced shortly after
the U.S. F-86 Sabre jet made its debut, was the first Soviet
348 Van Cleave, pp. 17 and 22.
349 Letter from Michael J. Deane dated 19 July 1983 to an
American intelligence official, recounting his conversation
with a Soviet military attach, as cited in Brian D. Dailey,
"Deception, Perceptions Management, and Self-Deception in Arms
Control: An Examination of the ABM Treaty," in Dailey and
Parker, p. 257.




jet fighter to enter service in quantity; it is estimated that
as many as 15,000 of these aircraft were eventually produced.
Other interceptors quickly followed: the MiG-17 Fresco, a
subsonic day fighter in 1952; and the MiG-19 Farmer, the first
supersonic fighter, in 1955. The MiG-19 had a limited all-
weather capability, 351 but the first true all-weather fighter,
the subsonic Yak-25 Flashlight, was also introduced in 1955. 352
By this time, about 4,000 jet interceptors were committed to
Soviet air defense. Subsequent fighters improved on these
capabilities. The MiG-21 Fishbed, a supersonic aircraft with
limited all-weather capability, and the Su-9 Fishpot, a
supersonic all-weather fighter, both entered service in 1959;
another supersonic all-weather aircraft, the Yak-28 Firebar,
became operational in the early 1960s. 353
Although the Yak-28 is still in service, it and other
fighter-interceptor aircraft introduced in the 1960s (the Su-
15 Flagon and the Tu-128 Fiddler) comprise less than a third
of the current Soviet inventory of strategic air defense
aircraft. The largest contingent of the Soviet air defense
force consists of the variable-geometry-wing MiG-23 Flogger,
which is equipped with look-down radar for detecting cruise
missiles. A substantial number of MiG-25 Foxbat aircraft are
351 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 146.
352 Deane, p. 24.
353 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 146.
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also dedicated to air defense; the remainder of the Soviet
interceptor force is even more advanced: the Su-27 Flanker
and MiG-31 Foxhound both have a true look-down/shoot-down
capability which enables them not only to see but also
intercept cruise missiles. 354 The point is that the Soviet
Union is constantly improving its ability to intercept the
air-breathing threat to its territory; although advances may
be incremental, they are steady and continuing.
A total of approximately 2300 fighter-interceptor aircraft
are allocated to the National Air Defense Forces. 355 As with
SAM systems, currently operational Soviet fighter- interceptor
aircraft will be covered more fully in the chapter on net
assessment.
K. BALLISTIC MISSILE DEFENSE
Although the exact year the Soviets initiated research on
ballistic missile defense is unknown, Western experts agree
that circumstantial evidence indicates it was probably
sometime in the late 1940s. 356 The Soviets have admitted that
they engaged in antiballistic missile defense research,
development, and experiments "after the Great Patriotic
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War, " 357 but officially expressed interest in ballistic missile
defense systems dates only to the mid-1950s, when Marshall
Malinovsky emphasized the need to devote greater attention "to
the problems of air defense and antimissile defense." 358 These
programs paralleled Soviet development of long-range offensive
ballistic missiles, undoubtedly in accordance with their
dialectic predeliction to develop simultaneously both
"measures" and counter-measures. 60
The Soviet interest in defensive systems was paraded as
evidence of the peace-loving nature of the Soviet state. "It
is obvious that the creation of an effective anti-missile
defense merely serves to build up the security of the
peaceable, non-aggressive state," noted General Talensky. 360
The Soviet Union insisted that it was constantly threatened
by aggressive capitalist nations; it needed defenses as part
of its plan to ensure its survival. Ballistic missile
defenses were not intended as a total defense in themselves,
but as another means to limit damage in "circumstances that
virtually deny the possibility of surviving unscathed. What
might appear useless to the U.S., with its much more demanding
357 Surikov, p. 21.
358 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 150.
60 Honor M. Catudal, Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin
to Gorbachev (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press
International, Inc., 1989), p. 190.
360 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 215.
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perceptions of what ballistic missile defense must provide,
might have incremental value in Soviet military eyes." 361
Furthermore, defenses served to legitimize the integrity
of the Soviet state. "The advantage of anti-missile systems
in the political and international law context," said
Talensky, "is that their use is caused by an act of
aggression, and they will simply not work unless an
aggressor's rocket makes its appearance in flight over a given
area. There will be no difficulty at all in deciding who is
the aggressor and who the attacked." 362
In October, 1961, at the Twenty-Second Party Congress,
Marshall Malinovsky made the initial specific affirmation of
Soviet success in ballistic missile defenses. "The problem
of destroying ballistic missiles in flight, " he said, "has
been successfully solved." After his announcement, public
references to Soviet research advances proliferated, and the
offense-defense relationship was continually reiterated. 363
As rhetoric emerged, so did physical evidence of Soviet
efforts, which developed along two different lines. The first
deployment venture, the Griffon-missile system near Leningrad,
exhibited an air-defense approach to ballistic missile
defense. Construction of this system commenced in 1961, but
361 Stevens, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 188.
362 Talensky, in Brzezinski, p. 214.
363 Catudal, p. 191.
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whether or not it was actually BMD-capable is still unknown. 364
The Griffon missile, the first alleged BMD missile to be
publicly displayed, was included in the November Day parade
in 1963. This two-stage missile had an altitude range of
about 25 to 30 miles, a slant range of about 100 miles, and
an estimated speed of three to five times the speed of sound.
It could carry either a conventional or nuclear warhead. 365
Although the Soviets were claiming a lead in BMD development
at the time (and, incidentally, stressing that BMD was
"exceptionally expensive"), 366 the Griffon system had
"considerable shortcomings" and, in fact, appeared to be
inferior to the Nike-Zeus system concurrently under
development in the U.S. The Soviets evidently reached the
same conclusion, since deployment was halted in 1963, and the
system subsequently dismantled. Shortly after Griffon was
removed, a second system was erected in the same region.
Although it exhibited characteristics typical of BMD systems,
364 Stevens, "Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet
Union," p. 314; and Stevens, "The Soviet BMD Program," in
Carter and Schwartz, p. 195.
Catudal, p. 191; Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, pp.
150-151.
366 Catudal, p. 191.
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by the late 1960s Western experts had decided that It was
another air defense system. 367
In October, 1962, construction which demonstrated the
second line of Soviet BMD development began. This system,
which circled Moscow at a distance of about 50 miles from the
center of the city, was obviously Intended to provide defense
against ballistic missiles. Although six or eight complexes,
each with sixteen launching points, were started, only four
were eventually completed, but this was enough to prove that
the Soviet Union took BMD seriously.
At the time, the Soviets were advocating what came to be
known as the Gromyko plan. This plan called for the reduction
(to very low levels) of offensive missiles, which would be
protected by a BMD shield that would also shelter population
and forces. 369 The Soviets considered mutual vulnerability of
the superpowers to be not only undesirable, but also
destabilizing, and factors which detracted from stability
could, according to this view, lead to international crises.
Strongly committed to a combination of both offensive forces
and an effective BMD system as a means to "substantially
367 Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 151; and Rhle, in
Brzezinski, p. 241.
368 Rhle, in Brzezinski, p. 241-242; Stevens, "Ballistic
Missile Defense in the Soviet Union, " p. 314; and Stevens, in
Carter and Schwartz, p. 194.





increase the stability of mutual deterrence," the Soviets put
no faith in theories that forced them to rely on the kindly
intentions of the U.S. and other Western nuclear powers.
Soviet measures of self-defense might encourage adversaries
to refrain from launching a nuclear attack against the Soviet
Union, and provide some measure of protection if those
adversaries could not be deterred. 370 As Talensky said at the
time, "for a peace-loving state, anti-ballistic missile
systems are only a means of strengthening its security." 371
The Moscow BMD system was based on the long-range,
exoatmospheric Galosh interceptor, which was housed in
reloadable, above-ground launchers. Paraded in protective
canisters in Moscow beginning in 1964, the interceptor, also
designated the ABM-IB, was nuclear-armed and quite large; in
fact, it was bigger than the Minuteman ICBM it was presumably
intended to counter. All of the Galosh components,
particularly the radars, were very large, but they lacked
sophistication. This meant that, although it could provide
coverage over thousands of square miles around Moscow, the
system was highly vulnerable to saturation, decoys, and
370 Bruce Parrot, The Soviet Union and Ballistic Missile
Defense (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1987), p. 24.
371 Nikolai Talensky, "Anti-Missile Systems and the
Problems of Disarmament," Mezhdunarodnaya zhizn' ," No. 10
(October, 1964), p. 34, as cited in Deane, p. 31.
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nuclear effects. 372 The purpose of the system, however, has
since been described by Soviet commentators as protection of




a mission which it might have
been capable of handling.
Through most of the 1960s, the Soviets made numerous
public statements regarding their BMD capabilities. 375 "I used
to say sometimes in my speeches that we had developed an
antimissile missile that could hit a fly, " Khrushchev says in
his memoirs, "but of course that was just rhetoric to make our
adversaries think twice." 376 During this period, as they
completed their initial BMD deployments, the Soviets
completely rejected increasingly frequent Western suggestions
that BMD was destabilizing. 377
Although then, as now, there were "rather large gaps" in
what the West knew about "Soviet BMD programs, achievements,
372 Catudal, p. 191; Stevens, in Carter and Schwartz, p.
194; Hoist, in Hoist and Schneider, p. 151; Van Cleave, p. 20;
and Rhle, in Brzezinski, p. 242.
373 Surikov, p. 21.
374 Stevens, "Ballistic Missile Defense in the Soviet
Union," p. 314.
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technical objectives, and overall intent," 378 roost Western
authorities agree that Soviet military doctrine thoroughly
supported strategic defensive principles. Since that time,
however, it has been "virtually impossible" to find
information on Soviet BMD capabilities in Soviet sources. 379
The reasons for the sudden absence of Soviet references to
their BMD programs was, of course, the Strategic Arms
Limitation Talks, or SALT I.
The Soviet Union's immediate and adamant response to
initial U.S. SALT proposals was that offensive, not defensive,
weapons should be the focus of negotiations; indeed, a review
of the period preceding the talks shows that during the 1960s,
"the Soviets completely rejected the Western characterization
of ABM as a destabilizing weapon." By the time the talks
started, however, the negotiating positions of the two sides
had reversed: the American delegation pressed for discussion
of offensive weapons, while the Soviets wanted to talk about
ABMs, and leave offensive weapons off the agenda. 380 The two
sides eventually agreed to a limit of a single ABM deployment
site, but the Soviets not only criticized the American team
for concentrating on technical details and ignoring broader
political issues, but also refused to discuss the technical
378 Stevens, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 183.
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aspects of the limitations, 381 a fact which continues to cause
various problems for the U.S.
What changed the Soviet attitudes toward ABMs? The
Soviets contend the respective delegations to the talks
"arrived at a common understanding of the importance of
effective measures for the limitation of ABM systems as a
major factor in curbing the strategic offensive arms race and
lessening the danger of war." 382 At the time, this theme was
reiterated continually in various public forums, but only
until the U.S. ratified the treaty. 383
These assertions may be mere rhetoric. The Soviets may
have agreed to the treaty for reasons that have little to do
with the arms race or strategic stability. First, and most
important to the Soviets, the treaty and its associated
negotiations forced U.S. recognition of Soviet power, without
requiring that the Soviet Union modify its policies or accept
U.S. concepts such as mutual deterrence. Consequently, the
U.S., and not the Soviet Union, was forced to give up its
"position of strength" policy. 384
Second, the Soviets were having some difficulties in
developing their ABM systems, and had little to lose by
381 Deane, pp. 50 and 55.
382 Surikov, p. 25.
383 Deane, p. 71.
384 Deane, p. 69.
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agreeing to the ambiguous limitations contained in the
treaty. 385 Finally, the U.S. was proceeding with its Safeguard
deployment at Grand Forks, and the Soviets perceived a need
to restrain, if not halt entirely, U.S. advances in ABM
technology. U.S. technology was already substantially better
than that the Soviets possessed at the time, 386 and the terms
of the treaty might help prevent U.S. acquisition of a
technological lead that the Soviets might find it impossible
to overcome. 387 While the U.S. viewed Soviet acceptance of
the treaty as a sign that they had also accepted U.S.
deterrence principles, the Soviets were buying time for their
ABM research and development programs to catch up.
There is no evidence that the ABM Treaty has significantly
affected these programs. In fact, both air defense and ABM
research and development activities "appear to have
flourished," with substantial deployments of the former, 388
and probable gains on U.S. achievements in the latter.
Although BMD is the only type of strategic defensive
program currently subject to arms control restraints, public
reference to Soviet efforts in this area are extremely rare.
This has been attributed to two factors. First, as with many
385 Deane and Kass, p. 107.
Stevens, "Speculations on Soviet Responses to SDI,"
p. 315.
387 Dailey, in Dailey and Parker, p. 226.
388 Catudal, p. 207.
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other of their activities, the Soviets try to ensure that as
much secrecy as possible surrounds their true intentions and
real capabilities. Second, the Soviets realize that there is
a great propaganda advantage in saying nothing about their
abilities. 389 Without evidence of some kind, such as public
statements, it is difficult for adversaries, such as the U.S.,
to prove to an audience that the Soviets actually possess
defensive capabilities; those audiences might infer that the
Soviets have no strategic defenses.
In reality, despite Soviet assertions that "only mutual
restraint in strategic ABM systems makes it possible to
advance along the path of strategic offensive arms limitation
and reduction," 390 the restraint has been unilateral, and
pretty much confined to U.S. efforts. According to the U.S.
Department of Defense, the current Soviet ABM program
"involves a much greater investment of plant space, capital,
and manpower" than that of the U.S. 391 Western observers noted
that "there were increasingly frequent signs that despite the
ABM Treaty, the Soviet Union was intensifying its missile
defense program, concealing this merely by changes of
nomenclature and organizational structure within the Soviet
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forces. .. .the numerous air defense missiles deployed
throughout the Soviet Union slowly but surely took on the
quality of a missile defense system. New radar equipment
plugged the remaining gaps." 392
Expansion and upgrading of the Moscow ABM system began in
1978, 393 as old Galosh launchers were replaced with long-range,
exoatmospheric interceptors and high-acceleration,
endoatmospheric interceptors, both silo-based. 394 But this is
merely one aspect of a program whose implications extend far
beyond the single site described in the ABM Treaty. The
Soviets contend that the "ABM defense system of Moscow is
maintained in combat-ready condition with changes in its
performance character permitted by the ABM Treaty." 395
Although this may be true, the Moscow ABM site is only one
element of what can be described as an extensive defensive
system with the potential to far exceed, both geographically
and functionally, the restraints imposed by the treaty. The
most compelling evidence that the Soviet Union may be
preparing an ABM defense of its national territory lies in
the Soviet radar and surveillance network, whose components
include transportable elements such as Flat Twin and Pawn Shop
392 Rhle, in Brzezinski, p. 244.
393 Churba, p. 55.
394 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 44.
395 Surikov, p. 35.
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radars, and nine large phased-array radars, including the one
located at Krasnoyarsk.
Still under construction, the Krasnoyarsk radar, because
of its orientation and location, clearly violates the ABM
Treaty; it is the last of a series of long-range, phased-array
systems that form a nearly complete ring of ballistic missile
detection coverage for the Soviet landmass. These newer
radars "duplicate and augment coverage provided by the older
Hen House ballistic missile early warning radars, but could
also provide the detailed detection and tracking data which
would be required for a nationwide ABM system." 396
The Krasnoyarsk radar aroused great concern. "Now it
became clear that what many observers had until then
considered to be no more than somewhat halfhearted or aimless
activity on the part of the Soviets was in fact forming a
definite pattern. Slowly but surely, the Soviet Union was
building up a network of communications systems, mobile air-
and missile-defense radar installations together with
operational radar equipment, as a basis for a nationwide
missile defense system capable of rapid deployment." 397 The
discovery of the Krasnoyarsk radar seemed to bring Soviet
efforts into focus and to force the West into the realization
396 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 56.
Rhle, in Brzezinski, p. 245
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that the Soviets had not, in fact, been educated by the West
in the virtues of mutual vulnerability.
"Rapid deployment" and "nationwide defense" are the
potential Soviet capabilities that most disturb the West. If
the Soviet Union were able to achieve a unilateral advantage
in ballistic missile defense, "Western vulnerability to Soviet
military power would be increased because Soviet vulnerability
to retaliation would be decreased." 398 The Soviets, with
active missile interceptors, radar production lines,
operational experience with ABM systems and how those systems
interact with strategic offensive forces, and a cadre of ABM
personnel, already possess a formidable ABM infrastructure. 399
And the Soviet Union is the only country in the world that
maintains such a system today. 400
In spite of the obviously tremendous defensive effort the
Soviets have been involved in for over forty years, the Soviet
Union has been quite vocal in its opposition to the U.S. SDI.
"No state is so strong a proponent of strategic defense in
practice as the Soviet Union, yet none is more strongly
opposed to SDI in public. Standing Soviet rhetoric side-by-
side with their strategic defense efforts, one is led to
398 Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western
Alliance
, p. 183.
399 Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power: An
Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 104.
400 Van Cleave, p. 20.
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conclude that the Soviets are far more interested in
stigmatizing the U.S. defense effort than engaging in a
reasonable and constructive dialogue on the future of the
strategic relationship and the role of strategic defenses in
it." 401
Using the ABM Treaty as a basis for criticism, the Soviets
criticize SOI as though it were a unilateral Western
initiative. "As early as during the SALT I talks," says one
Soviet expert, "the USSR and the USA arrived at a clear
understanding that in the conditions of parity in strategic
offensive forces the acquisition of an additional defense
capability by either side would be tantamount to the
acquisition by it of a preemptive nuclear strike
capability." 402 The Soviets also prey on popular fears: "[W]e
wanted to pinpoint SDI," Gorbachev notes, "so that the whole
world could see that it is the chief obstacle in the way of
nuclear disarmament." 403 The expert is more graphic:
"Implementation of SDI would not only thwart the people's
hopes for a secure and non-nuclear world, it would also
increase the danger of a suicidal nuclear holocaust." 404
401 Rowny, p. 25.
402 Surikov, pp. 80-81.
403 Gorbachev, p. 244.
404 Surikov, p. 15.
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Curiously, the Soviet Union also contends that it has at
its disposal "all that it needs to meet the SDI challenge by
developing and changing its defense potential which, even if
the SDI program is fully implemented, will prevent the USA
from tipping the military-strategic balance in its favor." 405
It is clear to Western experts that the Soviet Union will
certainly continue to develop its ABM potential, regardless
of the outcome of the U.S. SDI program. 406 "[T]he key point,"
according to the British Secretary of State for Defense, "is
that this is not a new Soviet programme; it is not a response
to the SDI - far from it, it long predates it - it is not
something peripheral to the Soviet effort in defence research;
it is a key component of it." 407
L. CIVIL DEFENSE
The Soviets describe their civil defense program as a
"peace-strengthening measure," but it is much more than that.
The Soviets consider civil defense to be another aspect of
their military strategy, 408 constituting in the Soviet view
405 Surikov, p. 173.




George Younger, in Great Britain, Parliament,
Parliamentary Debates (House of Commons) 19 February 1986,
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"one more major obstacle in the way of the unleashing of a new
world war by the imperialists." 409
Initiated as early as 1920, the Soviet civil defense
effort was originally developed as a response to conventional
and chemical weapons. In the early 1930s, the threat of air
attack and incendiary weapons kept the program alive, as did
Hitler's accession to power in Germany, which prompted
increased shelter construction, an expanded civil defense
organization, and, in 1933, the first nationwide civil defense
training program. The civil defense infrastructure developed
prior to World War II became the basis for the organization
that exists today throughout all levels of Soviet society. 410
During the war, organizations and concepts already in
existence were employed, 411 as the German attack on the Soviet
Union triggered a general mobilization of the population. On
2 July 1941, less than two weeks after the German invasion
commenced, civil defense training and participation in civil
defense work became mandatory for all Soviet citizens from 16
409 A.S. Milovidov, Filosofkoye Naslediye V.I. Lenina i
Problemy Sovremennoy Voyny
,
The Philosophical Heritage of V.I.
Lenin and Problems of Contemporary War (Moscow: Voyenizdat,
1972), p. 68, as cited in Scott and Scott, p. 97.
Leon Gour, Civil Defense in the Soviet Union
(Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1962), pp. 2-
4.
411 Scott and Scott, p. 99.
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to 60 years of age. Western experts concede that their
wartime performance was "generally good." 412
DOSAAF, the Volunteer Society for Assistance to the Army,
Air Force and Navy, was formed in 1951. Described as a
"defense-patriotic organization whose purpose is active
cooperation for strengthening the military capability of the
country and for preparing workers for the defense of the
socialist fatherland," 413 DOSAAF comprises 341,000 primary
organizations. 414 Beginning in 1952, DOSAAF members were
required to take a 20-hour civil defense course415 in order to
prepare them to carry out their responsibilities for warning,
communications, preserving order, and safety. 416 By 1954,
nuclear weapons were included in the curriculum; in 1956,
bacteriological weapons were added. Since that time, Soviet
civil defense efforts have been directed against the entire
spectrum of modern offensive weapons. 417
412 Gour, p. 6.
413 Bol ' shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedii , Great Soviet
Encyclopedia (Moscow: Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House,
1973), p. 465, as cited in Scott and Scott, p. 117.
414 Yezhegodnik, 1981, Bol ' shaya Sovetskaya Entsiklopedii
,
Yearbook, 1981, of the Great Soviet Encyclopedia (Moscow:
Soviet Encyclopedia Publishing House, 1981), p. 23, as cited
in Scott and Scott, p. 117.
415 Gour, p. 7.
416 Scott and Scott, p. 100,
417 Gour, p. 8.
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The existing structure of Soviet agencies, from the
national down to the local level, was used as the basis of
Soviet civil defense organization. 418 Since 1961, when
responsibility for these programs was transferred from the
Ministry of the Interior, 419 the Ministry of Defense has been
the central headquarters and control apparatus for the civil
defense network. 420 The Chief of Civil Defense, who since 1972
has also been a Deputy Minister of Defense, 421 directs all
national and local, military and civilian programs. 422
The corps of full-time civilian civil defense personnel
is probably about equal in numbers to the military Civil
Defense Troops. These civilians occupy posts in central and
local government and industrial enterprises, and are
responsible for preparing civil defense plans, such as those
for evacuation and rescue, for their respective organizations;
carrying out the universal training program; and recruiting,
organizing, and training multitudes of part-time personnel. 423
The objective of civilian civil defense is the protection of
418 Scott and Scott, p. 102.
419 Catudel, pp. 262-263.
420 Christopher Donnelly, Red Banner (Surrey, UK: Jane's
Information Group, 1988), p. 165.
421 Scott and Scott, pp. 65 and 97.
422 Donnelly, p. 165.
423 Donnelly, p. 165.
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the population as a whole and the economy, and post-attack
424
recovery.
Military officers and conscripts comprise the regular
Civil Defense Troops, which might be considered the backbone
of the Soviet civil defense effort. 425 Established sometime
prior to 1965, these troops are assigned directly to military
districts; contingents are stationed within cities throughout
the Soviet Union. 426 Civil Defense Troops are trained in basic
soldiering, the operation of engineering machinery,
firefighting, traffic control, first aid, and other related
subjects, and they have many responsibilities. 427
Civil defense in the Soviet Union is a much broader
undertaking than has ever been considered in the West. It
includes "extensive planning for the transition of the entire
State and economy to a wartime posture." 428 In terms of
specific functions, this means that Soviet Civil Defense
Troops are responsible for communications service; effective
early warning; medical services, including anti-epidemic
measures; maintaining civil order; dispersal of the essential
workforce from large towns to surrounding villages;
424 Scott and Scott, pp. 107-108.
425 Donnelly, p. 165.
426 Scott and Scott, pp. 65 and 107.
427 Donnelly, p. 165.
428 Van Cleave, p. 31.
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engineering duties, such as providing access routes,
demolishing unstable buildings, clearing rubble, and building
shelters; animal and plant life protection; transportation;
power sources; provisions and supplies, including the creation
of food and water reserves; evacuation and concealment of the
essential research and development establishment; repair,
maintenance, and evacuation of equipment and vehicles; and
search-and-rescue operations.
As might be expected, segments of Soviet society receiving
civil defense protection have been prioritized. Soviet
leadership receives the greatest attention, followed by
military command and control, war-supporting industrial
production, the essential workforce, and finally, as much of
the population as possible. 430
Through the 1950s and into the early 1960s, the Soviet
civil defense program put emphasis on a shelter program
similar to that being developed in the U.S. at the time.
Although evacuation was later considered to be more
workable, 431 open sources in the West claim that, at most, the
Soviets have conducted only a single evacuation drill, and
429 Scott and Scott, pp. 105-106; and Donnelly, p. 165-
166.
430 Van Cleave, p. 31.
431 Scott and Scott, p. 102.
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that was of the work force of a single industry from just one
city. 432
Although some sources indicate that there is little
evidence of a widespread construction program, 433 shelters were
again made the dominant feature of the civil defense program
in about 1975, perhaps because the subways in larger Soviet
cities could serve as adequate shelter facilities for hundreds
of thousands of people. Long-range plans include subways in
all cities with populations of a million or more; all subways
built up to now are quite deep and have massive blast doors. 434
According to former chief of Air Force intelligence Major
George Keegan, Jr., analysts have determined through
photointerpretation that, in 39 of the largest Soviet cities,
every apartment building constructed since 1955 has a massive
shelter in its basement. These shelters are connected by
tunnels which contain water and electrical power conduits and
hospital-type facilities. A Soviet defector has described
food shelters three to four times the size of a football
field, each at a minimum depth of 60 feet and stocked with
oats, barley, greens, and American wheat. 435
432 Catudel, p. 263.
433 Donnelly, p. 168.
434 Scott and Scott, p. 110.
435 William E. Burrows, Deep Black (New York: Random
House, 1986), pp. 5-6 and 8.
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Worked-out mines supplement subways as population
relocation facilities; they are also used as concealed storage
sites for military stores, equipment, and strategic stocks
reserve, and as potential locations for wartime economic
activity. 436
All factories and other establishments are required to
have shelters for their personnel and an evacuation plan;
essential industries must have a mobilization plan as well.
Mandatory civil defense drills are included in these plans. 437
Duplication of essential industries is recommended by Soviet
military planners, although observers have concluded that it
is unlikely that this has been achieved except possibly in "a
few, very critical areas." 438
Fixed and mobile facilities for command of Soviet
offensive forces have been also been established. At least
one exurban command post is dedicated to every significant
military command element; most of these are near-surface
bunkers, but there is also an extensive network of deep-
underground complexes for the highest civilian and military
leadership: the Politburo, Central Committee, Ministry of
Defense, and the KGB. These deep-underground facilities are
sometimes hundreds of meters below the surface, and can
436 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 61.
437 Scott and Scott, pp. 110-111.
438 Scott and Scott, pp. 111-112.
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accommodate thousands of people for extended periods of
time. 439 General Keegan has estimated that in the Moscow area
alone there are about 75 underground command posts, each about
the size of the Pentagon and covered with five hundred feet
of reinforced concrete and earth fill. His analysts found
similar, smaller shelters throughout the military chain of
command "in every city in every military district." 440
The U.S. Department of Defense believes that the deep
underground system may enable "independent operations to be
carried out from these facilities for many months. The top
leadership has the option of going by secret subway lines out
to Vrukovo Airfield, about 17 miles southwest of the Kremlin,
and from there flying to remote facilities. . .which would
permit the surviving leadership to reconstitute Soviet
military power for ensuing military operations." 441 It is
estimated that over 175,000 personnel could be accommodated
in this underground system. 442
Sovietologists Harriet and William Fast Scott note that
another aspect of Soviet civil defense that deserves attention
is the "moral-political preparation of the population and the
439 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
,
p. 17.
440 Burrows, p. 7.
441 U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
, p. 61.
442 Van Cleave, p. 31.
131
military indoctrination of Soviet youth, " which results in the
publication of dozens of books and hundreds of articles on the
subject every year. 443 Civil defense training for Soviet
citizens is a lifetime program which begins with short courses
in second and third grades, continues at Pioneer recreation
camps, where most children spend about two weeks every summer,
and is taught at universities, where a fifty-hour course
prepares students to become civil defense instructors or
DOSAAF leaders. 444 By the time they complete secondary school,
students have had at least 62 classroom hours and more than
75 hours of evacuation and field exercises in civil defense. 445
One of the desired results of the planned civil defense
effort is the maintenance by the leadership of a war-
preparedness attitude within the Soviet population, which
results in a significant level of discipline and paramilitary
habits. 446 This helps the leadership ensure continued control
of the population under wartime conditions. 447
The efficiency of the Soviet civil defense system is
described as inconsistent, since the more important a town,
443 Scott and Scott, pp. 3 and 113.
444 George Kolt, "The Soviet Civil Defense Program,
"
Strategic Review
, Spring, 1977, p. 55.
445 Evans M. Harrell, "Civil Defense in Other Countries,"
in Dowling and Harrell, p. 109.
446 Catudel, p. 269.
447 Scott and Scott, p. 99.
132
factory or similar site is to the function of the military and
the government, the greater its level of civil defense
preparations. 448 However, the Committee on the Present Danger
has estimated that Soviet civil defense measures would reduce
the number of Soviet casualties resulting from a nuclear
exchange to about one tenth those the U.S. would suffer. 449





V. THE NET ASSESSMENT
A. BACKGROUND
The strategic defensive doctrines of the Soviet Union and
the United States have been examined at some length in the
previous two chapters. The evident differences in these
doctrines have resulted in strikingly disparate concrete
manifestations of the respective doctrines, as might be
expected.
Net assessments are often criticized because they are
little more than bean counts. If this were to be a truly
accurate, complete net assessment, it would have to include
not only the doctrines described above, but also force
exchange models, logistical and operational factors,
warfighting objectives, and so on. 450 In an assessment of
strategic defenses, an examination of the offensive forces
that the defenses would be expected to counter might be
especially valuable.
The object here, however, is merely to examine the
strategic defenses deployed by the U.S. and the Soviet Union
as a result of their distinct military doctrines. The numbers
of active systems will be compared, and where appropriate,
450 Aaron L. Friedberg, "The Assessment of Military
Power," International Security
,
Winter, 1987/88, Vol. 12, No.
3, p. 194.
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performance characteristics will be described. Unless
otherwise indicated, the information provided is from The
Military Balance
,
published by the International Institute for
Strategic Studies in London, and therefore current as of 1
June 1988.
B. SOVIET SYSTEMS
According to the U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet air
defense systems are "better able today than in 1981 to degrade
effectively strikes by U.S. and NATO air forces. 451 In view
of the Soviet proclivity for constant, albeit incremental,
upgrading of systems, it might be assumed that similar
improvements, increases, and/or modernization have occurred
in antiballistic missile systems and civil defense as well.
1. Antiballistic Missile Systems
There are currently 16 ABM-1 Galosh launchers deployed
around Moscow. The Galosh interceptor has a slant range of
200 miles, and is armed with a three megaton nuclear warhead.
This exoatmospheric interceptor is launched from a fixed
site. 452 In the near future, Western specialists anticipate
replacement of the ABM-1 with the ABM-X-3, perhaps as soon as
this year. This system includes the SH-08 and SH-11
interceptors. The endoatmospheric SH-08 Gazelle relies on
U.S. Department of Defense, Soviet Military Power:
An Assessment of the Threat 1988
, p. 80.
452 Collins, The U.S.-
p. 185; and Hobbs, p. 133.
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atmospheric sorting to distinguish decoys from warheads,
carries a low-yield nuclear warhead and has a range of 80-300
kilometers. 453 The exoatmospheric SH-11 modified Galosh has
a slant range of 150-500 kilometers, and may be able to stop
and start its propulsion systems four or five times at very
high altitudes, allowing the interceptor to loiter while
ground radars sort out incoming warheads from decoys. 454
2. Interceptor Aircraft
The Soviets have deployed about 2,300 fighter-
interceptor aircraft. These include: 455
* 900 MiG-23 Flogger B/G, which reach speeds of Mach
2.3, have a combat radius of 1,150 kilometers, and
carry two AA-7 Apex and 4 AA-8 Aphid missiles.
* 405 MiG-25 Foxbat E, which reach speeds of Mach 2.8,
have a combat radius of 1,450 kilometers, and carry
four AA-6 Acrid missiles.
* 225 MiG-31 Foxhound A, which reach speeds of Mach 2.4,
have a combat radius of 2,100 kilometers, and carry
four AA-9 Amos missiles.
* 405 Su-15 Flagon A/D/E/F, which reach speeds of Mach
2.0, have a combat radius of 1,000 kilometers, and
carry two AA-3 Anab missiles.
* 90 Su-27 Flanker, which reach speeds of Mach 2.0, have
a combat radius of 1,500 kilometers, and carry six
air-to-air missiles.
* 60 Yak-28P Firebar, which reach speeds of Mach 1.8,
have a combat radius of 900 kilometers, and carry two
AA-5 Ash missiles.
453 Hobbs, p. 132; and Yost, p. 35
454 Yost, p. 35; and Hobbs, p. 133
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* 50 Tu-28 Fiddler B, which reach speeds of Mach 1.5,
have a combat radius of 1,500 kilometers, and carry
four AA-5 Ash missiles.
3. Surface- to-Air Missiles
About 8,600 launchers deployed at 1,200 sites. These
include: 456
* 1,620 SA-1 Guild (being replaced by SA-10); the Guild
has a celling of 60,000 feet and can deliver either
a nuclear or high explosive warhead. It operates from
a fixed launch site.
* 2,500 SA-2 Guideline (being replaced by SA-10); the
Guideline has a ceiling of 80,000 feet and can deliver
either a nuclear or 288-pound high explosive warhead.
It is launched from a fixed site.
* 1,150 SA-3 Goa ( 2 or 4 launcher rails; over 300
sites). The Goa has a ceiling of 40,000 feet and
carries a 132-pound high-explosive warhead. It
operates from a mobile site.
* 1,930 SA-5 Gammon (130 complexes); the Gammon has a
ceiling of 95,000 feet and delivers either a nuclear
or 132-pound warhead. Its launcher is mobile.
* 1,400 quad SA-10 Grumble, which may have potential
against some types of strategic ballistic missiles. 457
The Grumble has a ceiling of 80,000 feet and can carry
either a nuclear or high-explosive warhead. Its
launcher is semi-mobile.
4. Antiaircraft Artillery
Soviet air defense forces also operate 11,500
antiaircraft artillery pieces. 458
456 Collins, The U.S. -Soviet Military Balance 1980-1985
,
p. 185.
457 U.S. Department of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff,
United States Military Posture for FY89 (Washington, DC: U.S.
Government Printing Office, 1988), p. 89.
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5. Civil Defense
There are over 150,000 full-time civil defense
personnel in the Soviet Union; there are over 150,000 hardened
bunkers for the political leadership in the Soviet Union.
Annual Soviet civil defense spending averages between $2 and
$6 billion. 459
C. U.S. SYSTEMS
1. Antiballistic Missile Systems
The U.S. has no ABM systems currently deployed.
2. Interceptor Aircraft
There are about 276 fighter-interceptor aircraft
deployed for strategic defense in the United States. They
are divided among three regular Air Force squadrons (two in
the continental U.S. and one in Alaska) and twelve Air
National Guard squadrons (eleven in the continental U.S. and
one in Hawaii). The aircraft flown by these squadrons
includes: 460
* 102 F-15 Eagle, with a speed of Mach 2.5 and a range
of 1,770 kilometers; equipped with eight air-to-air
missiles.
* 42 F-16 Fighting Falcon, with a speed of Mach 2.0 and
a combat radius of 850 nautical miles; equipped with
four air-to-air missiles.
459 Keith B. Payne, Strategic Defense (Lanham, MD:
Hamilton Press, 1986), p. 49; and Dailey, in Dailey and
Parker, p. 243.
460 Gunston and Spick, p. 122; and Collins, The U.S.-




* 30 F-106 Delta Dart, with a speed of Mach 2.0 and a
combat radius of 525 nautical miles; equipped with
five air-to-air missiles.
* 126 F-4 Phantom, with a speed of Mach 1.19 and a range
of 2,816 kilometers; equipped with six air-to-air
missiles.
3. Surface- to-Air Missiles
There are no SAMs deployed in the United States.
4. Antiaircraft Artillery
There is no antiaircraft artillery deployed in the
U.S.
5. Civil Defense
There are about 7,000 full-time civil defense
personnel in the U.S., and less than one hundred hardened
bunkers for political leadership. The U.S. civil defense
budget is about $170 million per year, part of which is
dedicated to natural disaster preparedness. 461
461 Bethell, p. 11.
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VI. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
A. THE COMPARISON
The strategic defensive doctrines of the Soviet Union and
the United States have evolved in different directions, most
noticeably since the end of the second World War and the
conception of nuclear weapons. The Soviets have currently
deployed a range of antiaircraft defenses and civil defense
measures, and are in the process of bringing their
antiballistic missile defense up to treaty-permitted limits.
The strategic defenses of the U.S., on the other hand,
presently consist of only that number of fighter-interceptor
squadrons considered necessary for peacetime surveillance and
sovereignty of U.S. airspace.
The reasons for this great disparity in deployed strategic
defenses are varied. The history and geographic location of
the two nations, their concepts of deterrence, warfighting
doctrines and goals, national policies and political systems
have all impacted upon their decisions to maintain or forego
defensive forces. While U.S. efforts to develop civil
defenses have been sporadic at best, the Soviet Union has
constantly strived to improve and increase its extensive civil
defenses. While the U.S. has decided that antiballistic
missile defenses are either infeasible, not cost effective or
too imperfect to deploy, the Soviet Union has steadfastly
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endeavored to upgrade its ABM system. And while the U.S.
pronounced antiaircraft defenses useless without accompanying
ABMs, the Soviet Union has developed the world's densest air
defenses.
U.S. logic erroneously predicted that the Soviets would
see the wisdom of mutual theories of deterrence, and follow
the U.S. lead to eliminate or at least substantially decrease
strategic defenses. Minus ABM defenses, there would
supposedly be no incentive for a buildup of offensive forces,
and arms races could be avoided. The assertion that "in order
to deter, we cannot defend" has come to dominate accepted
strategic logic in the U.S., in spite of overwhelming evidence
that the Soviets were not subscribing to the logic. 462 As the
U.S. strategic nuclear arsenal has decreased in numbers and
megatonnage over the last twenty-odd year, the Soviets
achieved parity, and then superiority despite, and sometimes
because of, arms control treaties.
The Soviets have steadfastly pursued a course of action
which has resulted in a formidable combination of both
offensive and defensive forces. With the advent of the
Strategic Defense Initiative over six years ago, it appeared
as though the U.S. was attempting to add the defensive element
to its deterrent strategy. The president strongly supported
strategic defense, as did the American public. But the SDI,
462 Van Cleave, p. 10.
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after an investment of billions of dollars and hours, remains
a research program; the deployment decision for U.S. strategic
defenses has been deferred into the next decade.
B. THE CASE AGAINST STRATEGIC DEFENSE
Strategic defenses have been criticized for several
reasons. They are said to provoke offsetting countermeasures,
including expanded offenses. They can alarm a nation's
adversaries by giving them the impression that that nation is
aspiring to a first-strike capability, thereby provoking the
adversary to preempt. In the case of ABMs, strategic defenses
may violate existing treaties, and consequently undermine the
arms control process. 463 If unilaterally deployed, strategic
defenses frustrate mutual deterrence theories. 464 For the
U.S., strategic defenses can have particularly adverse
implications. Most Western Europeans have come to view
"mutual vulnerability as the soundest basis for long term
East-West political accommodation and cooperation. Without
the ABM Treaty, it is feared, an offense-defense arms race
would endanger prospects for arms control and dtente and
increase the risks of war." 465
463 McFarlane, p. 38,
464 Stevens, in Carter and Schwartz, p. 182.
465 David S. Yost, "The Reykjavik Summit and European
Security," SAIS Review
, Summer/Fall, 1987, pp. 10-11.
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Other arguments against strategic defense are based on
technology: because leakproof defenses are not yet possible,
a nation's attempt to defend itself is futile. As long as
defenses cannot guarantee perfect security, even discussing
them is wrong, since such discussions misrepresent the
character of the threat, and lull people into a false sense




C. SUPPORT FOR STRATEGIC DEFENSE
The case for strategic defense is equally strong.
Strategic defenses may remove or at least reduce the threat
of nuclear destruction, and facilitate mutual deterrence based
on survival rather than annihilation. According to the
argument, this would promote stability because there would be
little to gain from a nuclear exchange, instead of everything
to lose. 467
Defenses also reinforce deterrence by causing uncertainty
for attack planners, thereby diminishing their confidence in
the ability of their forces to execute an effective attack.
The U.S. Department of Defense notes that defenses need not
be leakproof to achieve this objective. 468 If deterrence
466 Rathjens, in Haley and Merrit, p. 56; and McFarlane,
p. 39.
467 Hobbs, p. 17.





should fail, strategic defenses can protect population and
other valuable assets; this protection can extend to allies
as well. 469
D. IMPLICATIONS OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE
"[Strategic] defenses, no matter how great their promise,
will not constitute the last move in high-tech arms
competition, and strategic defensive technology will not solve
the fundamental problems of political rivalry," two U.S.
strategists contend. 470 The ability of hardware alone -
whether offensive or defensive - to solve fundamental
differences in the objectives pursued by the U.S. and the
Soviet Union is questionable. What strategic defenses can do
is buy time for political issues to be resolved, for arms
reduction efforts to be effected, and for a possible shift to
deterrence based, at least in part, on survivability rather
than destruction.
There are few advocates for strategies based on defense
alone. The Soviets have chosen to couple their defenses with
strong offensive forces, but the U.S. has not yet added a
defensive element to its strategic doctrine, in spite of
support for defenses from various quarters. As William Odom
suggests, "[T]he lack of consensus for the Strategic Defense
469 Yost, Soviet Ballistic Missile Defense and the Western
Alliance
, p. 280; and U.S. Department of Defense, Annual
Report to the Congress Fiscal Year 1989
, p. 49.
470 Payne and Gray, p. 842.
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Initiative and civil defense indicates a limit to which the
West agrees with the Soviet Union on this issue." 471
The absence of strategic defenses, particularly when an
adversary has deployed such defenses, could result in "self-
deterrence in a crisis." 472 Without strategic defenses, U.S.
plans to inflict nuclear destruction through retaliation
against the Soviet Union become suspect, as do U.S promises
to provide a nuclear umbrella for allies. 473 Would the U.S.
risk inviting a Soviet attack against its cities, its people,
its national territory by responding to a Soviet an attack on
an ally with an attack on the Soviet Union? If the U.S. were
able to defend itself against a Soviet attack, its umbrella
would acquire an additional degree of credibility: there is
no doubt that a nation with strategic defenses would use them.
E. CONCLUSIONS
The increases in Soviet offensive capabilities are
especially sobering when coupled with the strategic defenses
the Soviet Union has already deployed, and the potential for
a nationwide defensive system the Soviets have cultivated.
The Soviets are incrementally removing from risk the assets-
-offensive forces, political and military leadership, economic
471 Odom, p. 121.
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resources, essential workforce--they value most, thereby
weakening the credibility of U.S. deterrent forces. The
Soviets have managed to shift the correlation of forces
increasingly in their favor, while the U.S. permitted first
its strategic superiority and then its position of parity to
erode. If the Soviet Union intends to pursue a goal of world
domination, such asymmetry could encourage the Soviets to use
their advantages to consolidate concrete gains. The U.S.
might be able to retaliate pursuant to a Soviet first strike,
but how effective would those retaliatory forces remaining be
against Soviet defense?
A double standard with regard to strategic defenses has
also developed. While the Soviet deployment of considerable
defenses has been accepted, the prospect of the U.S. merely
researching the possibility has resulted in expressions of
condemnation from allies and adversaries alike. The U.S. has
been especially sensitive to this criticism; it has probably
been a factor un inhibiting development of U.S. defenses.
The fact that the two superpowers have developed disparate
strategic doctrines is in itself dangerous. They may be
"playing the same game, " but each is using a vitally different
set of rules. This can result in confusion, doubt, and
misinterpretation of actions and motives. It is highly
unlikely that the Soviet Union will give up the defensive
element of its strategic doctrine; it might be wise for the
U.S. to add this element to its strategy in order to bring the
146
doctrines into line with each other. U.S. theories of mutual
deterrence were never accepted by the Soviet Union; perhaps
the U.S. might do well to change its position instead of
expecting its primary adversary to "come around." A shift in
U.S. strategy would not be an indication of weakness, but a
restoration of the U.S. to a position of increased strength.
"The lengths to which a defender might be prepared to go
depend on how much he values what is being defended. .. .The
capacity to meet defensive objectives can be expected to deter
either through anticipation or the experience of resistance
and retaliation which will force the opponent to recast his
strategic goals." 474 What the U.S. must defend - both
tangibles such as population and offensive forces, and
intangibles that might be described as the American way of
life - is seldom the subject of discussion, but of incredible
value nonetheless. Arguments rage over cost-effectiveness and
technological feasibility to the near exclusion of what
defenses might defend. When what might be defended is
considered, the issue revolves around whether to defend cities
or offensive forces. Defenses defend much more than either
of those.
474 Freedman, p. 20
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"What is the object of defense?" Clausewitz asks.
"Preservation," he insists. 475 Perhaps the U.S. should
consider preserving itself.
475 Clausewitz, p. 357.
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